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Passey, Rob Passey, Rockreation, Inc., Gwendolyn D. Schamel, Arthur Sutherland, Brian 
G. Tillotson, Kenny Tipton, Stephanie Tipton, Terry K. Van Duren, Bob Walters, 
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Vincenzina Walters, Bob Weaver, Jan Weaver, Don Wilkerson, Eleanor Willhard, 
Tolford Young, Mary Young, Roger Ball, and Claire Geddes. 
2. The respondent is the Utah Public Service Commission. 
3. Other parties or parties in interest include Questar Gas Company, Questar 
Corporation, Questar Regulated Services, Questar Pipeline Company, Questar 
Transportation Company, the Utah Division of Public Utilities, and the Utah Committee 
of Consumer Services. 
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IV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and resolve this petition for review, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, section 78-2-2(3)(e)(i). 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
By a report and order issued January 6, 2006, the Utah Public Service Commission 
approved a certain ,fGas Management Cost Stipulation" which was made by Questar Gas 
Company, the Utah Division of Public Utilities, and the Utah Committee of Consumer 
Services. This stipulation authorized Questar Gas Company to recover certain gas 
processing costs which had been incurred pursuant to a contract with an affiliate, Questar 
Transportation Company. By order issued August 30, 2004, however, the Utah Public 
Service Commission had found as a matter of fact and law that these costs were 
imprudently incurred, and, therefore, were ineligible for recovery. 
1. Petitioners question whether the Commission's ruling in August, 2004, is res 
judicata and, therefore, bars the order of January, 2006, or whether the Commission's 
findings in August, 2004, have collateral estoppel effect, likewise barring the order of 
January, 2006. The applicability of the doctrines of claim preclusion or issue preclusion 
to orders of the Commission presents a legal question. This Court reviews "the 
Commission's interpretations of general questions of law" using "a correction-of-error 
standard, with no deference to the expertise of the Commission." Utah Dept. of Admin. 
Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983). This issue was preserved for 
review in "Request of Petitioners for Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the Utah 
12 
Public Service Commission, Issued January 6, 2006, Approving a Gas Management Cost 
Stipulation," Record on Appeal, Volume V, pages 1156ff. 
2. Even if the Commission's August, 2004, order is not a bar to the January 2006, 
report and order, the latter is inconsistent with the former, and the Commission's failure 
adequately to justify this inconsistency raises an issue for determination. This Court has 
yet to determine the precise standard for review in matters involving unjustifiable 
inconsistency in agency actions. But petitioners submit that the standard should be a 
correction-of-error stand which, as noted above, affords no deference to the 
Commission's ruling. See, e.g., Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission, 75 
P.3d 481, 484-487 (Utah 2003). Cf. Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d 
1245, 1250-1254 (Utah 1992). This issue was preserved for review in "Request of 
Petitioners for Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the Utah Public Service 
Commission, Issued January 6, 2006, Approving a Gas Management Cost Stipulation," 
Record on Appeal, Volume V, pages 1156ff. 
3. Whatever bearing earlier adjudications or prior practice should have had on the 
Commission's January, 2006, report and order, petitioners question whether the gas 
processing costs should have been allowed in view of the absolute bar against affiliate 
transactions found in Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-4-26. This is an issue involving 
statutory interpretation and, hence, of legal analysis. The correction-of-error standard, 
accordingly, applies. The Commission's judgment on this point is entitled to no 
deference. See, e.g., Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Comfn, 658 P.2d 601, 608 
(Utah 1983). This issue was preserved for review in "Request of Petitioners for 
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Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the Utah Public Service Commission, Issued 
January 6, 2006, Approving a Gas Management Cost Stipulation," Record on Appeal, 
Volume V, pages 1156ff. 
4. Petitioners question whether the Commission, in blessing the Gas Management 
Cost Stipulation in the January 6, 2006, report and order, properly interpreted and applied 
a recently-enacted provision of the public utilities code which regulates the approval of 
settlements, namely, Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-1. The proper interpretation 
and application of a statute presents a legal issue. Legal issues are subject to a 
correction-of-error standard, and, accordingly, the Commission's views on this point are 
entitled to no deference. See, e.g., Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 658 
P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983). This issue was preserved for review in "Request of 
Petitioners for Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the Utah Public Service 
Commission, Issued January 6, 2006, Approving a Gas Management Cost Stipulation," 
Record on Appeal, Volume V, pages 1156ff. 
5. Petitioners question whether the Commission, given the nature of the 
proceedings for approval of the Gas Management Cost Stipulation, violated statutory and 
constitutional requirements of fair notice and due process in entering the January, 2006, 
Order. Whether an agency proceeding violates statutory or constitutional provisions is a 
legal question that is subject to the correction-of-error standard; agency action, under this 
standard, is entitled to no deference from the Court. See, e.g., Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. 
v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983). This issue was preserved for review 
in "Request of Petitioners for Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the Utah Public 
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Service Commission, Issued January 6, 2006, Approving a Gas Management Cost 
Stipulation," Record on Appeal, Volume V, pages 1156ff. 
VI. IMPORTANT PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The constitutional provisions, state statutes, and regulatory measures that 
petitioners deem important in connection with this petition for review are too lengthy to 
reproduce in the body of this brief. Accordingly, petitioners have reproduced these 
authorities in Addendum 1 which is attached to this brief. These authorities include: 
1. United States Constitution, Article XIV 
2. Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-4-4(4) 
3. Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-4-26 
4. Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-1 
5. Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-14 
6. Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-15 
7. Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-8 
8. Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-10 
9. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 
10. Utah Public Service Commission Rules, R746-100-10 F 1 
11. Utah Public Service Commission Rules, R746-100-10 F 3 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Procedural Posture 
Petitioners are ratepayers or shareholders of Questar Gas Company. They have 
petitioned this Court for judicial review of a "Report and Order/1 issued by the Utah 
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Public Service Commission (the "UPSC" or "Commission") January 6, 2006 (the 
"January 2006 Order"), approving a certain "Gas Management Cost Stipulation" which 
was made by the Questar Gas Company ("Questar Gas" or the "Utility"), the Utah 
Division of Public Utilities (the "UDPU" or "Division") and the Utah Committee of 
Consumer Services (the "UCCS" or the "Committee") on October 11, 2005 (the "2005 
Stipulation"). Petitioners sought this review after full compliance with all conditions 
found in Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-16. 
B. Factual Background 
The 2005 Stipulation was yet another attempt by Questar Gas to achieve a 
negotiated solution (the most recent in a series of stipulations) to a long-standing 
controversy respecting allowance — for ratemaking purposes — of costs associated with a 
gas processing facility, the so-called "C02 Plant" or "Plant." The Plant was built to 
process a type of gas — coal-seam gas — which, absent this processing, may be unsafe for 
use in appliances in the homes and businesses of Utah ratepayers. 
The Plant began operations as an interim, emergency measure, pending 
implementation of a retrofitting program that would adjust appliances so that gas 
processing would become unnecessary. Plant construction commenced in 1998 and, 
through no fewer than 12 dockets and for 8 years, at the UPSC and in the Utah Supreme 
Court, Questar Gas has been attempting to recover Plant-related costs ever since. The 
3
 The January 2006 Order and the 2005 Stipulation are reproduced for the convenience of 
the Court in Petitioners1 Addendum 1. 
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retrofitting program - 8 years into the Plant's life, and 2 years shy of original projections 
for complete recovery of Plant costs -- only recently has been launched. 
Certain regulators consistently have resisted efforts (until now) for cost recovery 
on the primary ground that those expenses — arising out of a contract between the Utility 
and an unregulated affiliate, Questar Transportation Company ("Questar Transportation11 
or "QTC") ~ were not qualified for allowance under so-called "prudence" standards as 
mandated by legal precedent and Commission practice. What is more, even if the 
decision to build the Plant and process the gas was prudent in some sense, that decision 
nevertheless was and is irredeemably tainted with affiliate influence and conflict of 
interest and, therefore, these expenses could not be and cannot be allowed for ratemaking 
purposes. 
(1) A Brief History of Prudence Review and Questar Gas 
Utilities are state-franchised monopolies. Regulatory agencies, rather than market 
forces, are expected to check the excesses of management. Questionable expenses, 
therefore, must be justified by utility managers. This justification, moreover, must 
demonstrate that, at the time the expense being questioned was in contemplation or took 
place, the utility's actions or inactions were the result of a conscientious review of all 
circumstances.4 
4
 The Utah legislature has codified prudence standards for ratemaking purposes in the 
recently enacted Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-4-4(4). Section 54-4-4(4) became 
effective on February 25, 2005, and, therefore, may not apply retroactively to the time 
Questar Gas decided to build the Plant in 1998. See, Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-
3. Nevertheless, Section 54-4-4(4) appears largely to restate the existing rules respecting 
prudence review at the UPSC. 
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In addition, where the expense under review arises from a transaction between the 
utility and its affiliate, that expense is to be placed under a regulatory microscope and 
subjected to heightened scrutiny. If the Commission finds affiliate influence in the 
making of the deal, the contract must be disapproved and all costs disallowed. See, 
Order, In the Matter of the Application of Questar Gas Company to Adjust Rates for 
Natural Gas Service in Utah, Dkt. No. 03-057-05, at 45-46 (UPSC August 30, 2004). 
This rule is designed as a palliative for conflicts of interest with utility affiliates, to insure 
that a utility's inter-corporate dealings remain subordinate to ratepayer interests, and in all 
events to preserve what some courts have called the "trust" relationship between utilities 
and ratepayers.5 
5
 See, e.g., Committee of Cons. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Common, 595 P.2d 871, 874 (Utah 
1979) {Wexpro /), as explained in Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Comm% 658 
P.2d 601, 618-619 (Utah 1983) {Wexpro II). 
Heightened scrutiny as an antidote for conflicts of interest in affiliate transactions has 
been emphasized by this Court. In U. S. West Communications v. Public Serv. Commfn, 
901 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah 1995), the Court distinguished between review of affiliate and 
nonaffiliate expenses, citing Boise Water Corp. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, 555 P.2d 
163, 169 (Idaho 1976), among other cases, which noted that the reason for this distinction 
"appears to be that the probability of unwarranted expenditures corresponds to the 
probability of collusion." (Emphasis supplied.) 
This distinction also is codified in our utilities code. Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-4-
4(4) may apply (post-February, 2005) to prudence review in ordinary situations, but Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 54-4-26 speaks directly to dealings between a utility and an 
affiliate. It provides as follows: "Every public utility when ordered by the commission 
shall, before entering into any contract for construction work or for the purchase of new 
facilities or with respect to any other expenditures, submit such proposed contract, 
purchase or other expenditure to the commission for its approval; and, if the commission 
finds that any such proposed contract, purchase or other expenditure diverts, directly or 
indirectly, the funds of such public utility to any of its officers or stockholders or to any 
18 
Whether an expense arises in the ordinary course of business or pursuant to a 
transaction with affiliates, however, all authorities agree that a review of the utility's 
action must be made as of the time when that action was taken. We are rightly suspicious 
of the Monday Morning Quarterback who, with the benefit of hindsight, would have 
played a better game. But more than just hindsight, the utility must show, at a minimum, 
that the game in fact was played, that questionable expenses were subjected to a 
reasonably prudent decision-making process of some sort. And regulators are expected 
to review this showing, making sure that utility deliberations were timely, thorough, 
relevant, and fair, protecting ratepayers, both substantively and procedurally, from the 
influence of any conflict at issue. 
Because the focus is on the decision-maker and decision-making at the time the 
action was taken, articulations of the rule respecting prudence often forbid or disparage 
any after-the-fact reconstruction of events to either warrant or disapprove a particular 
expense. This approach to prudence review has become an established practice at the 
UPSC. See, e.g., Report and Order, In the Matter of the Application of Mountain Fuel 
Supply to Adjust Rates for Natural Gas Service in Utah, Dkt. Nos. 91-057-11 and 91-
057-17 (UPSC September 10, 1993); Final Standards and Guidelines for Integrated 
Resource Planning for Mountain Fuel Supply, In the Matter of the Analysis of an 
Integrated Resource Plan for Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Dkt. No. 91-057-09, at 7 
corporation in which they are interested, or is not proposed in good faith for the economic 
benefit of such public utility, the commission shall withhold its approval of such contract, 
purchase or other expenditure, and may order other contracts, purchases or expenditures 
in lieu thereof for the legitimate purposes and economic welfare of such public utility." 
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(UPSC September 26, 1994); Order, In the Matter of the Application of Questar Gas 
Company to Adjust Rates for Natural Gas Service in Utah, Dkt. No. 03-057-05, at 27-33 
(UPSC August 30, 2004). And, as noted above, this practice now appears to be codified 
in Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-4-4(4)(a)(ii)("judged as of the time the action was 
taken"). 
In addition, one cannot know the "facts and circumstances" as they existed "at the 
time the action was taken," including whether that action was the subject of a timely, 
conscientious, and disinterested decision-making process ~ and we may not be able to 
resist the sort of hindsight speculation and after-the-fact reconstruction that the rule 
prohibits — absent records or other evidence that is contemporaneous with the event in 
question. The UPSC, therefore, has required utilities comprehensively to present this 
caliber of evidence in order to satisfy their burden of showing prudence. See, Order, In 
the Matter of the Application of Questar Gas Company to Adjust Rates for Natural Gas 
Service in Utah, Dkt. No. 03-057-05, at 33, 35, 43, and 49 (UPSC August 30, 2004) (the 
"August 2004 Order"). 
In other words, there must be reciprocity in the application of the rules respecting 
prudence. Just as regulators may not be revisionist historians, unfairly second-guessing 
the business judgments of utility managers, so also a utility which has failed timely to 
forecast events, or which cannot prove with contemporaneous evidence the quality and 
fairness of the decision-making with which it encountered those events, may not cure this 
lack of foresight with the speculations of hindsight. 
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Questar Gas is no stranger to regulatory problems respecting affiliate transactions. 
As early as the 1970s, Questar Gasfs predecessor in interest, Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company, spun off gas properties to a wholly-owned subsidiary, Wexpro. The 
legitimacy of this transaction was bitterly contested, resulting in regulatory scrutiny and 
judicial precedents, all of which affirmed the requirements of prudence review as well as 
the so-called "no profits to affiliates" rule. See, Committee of Cons. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979) ("Wexpro F) and Utah Dep.t of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. 
Serv. Com% 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) ? Wexpro IF). 
Over the years, these businesses continued to divide and multiply. In the 1990s, 
during the period when controversy over coal-seam gas and gas processing was gathering 
steam, these entities included a holding company, Questar Corporation ("Questar 
Corporation"), which owned and controlled a subsidiary entity, Questar Regulated 
Services ("Questar Regulated"), which in turn owned and controlled two subsidiaries, the 
sister corporations, "Questar Gas" and "Questar Pipeline." Questar Pipeline owns and 
controls the subsidiary entity which built the Plant, Questar Transportation. Petitioners' 
brief, for convenience, hereafter sometimes will refer to these companies collectively as 
the "Questar Companies" or the "Questar System." Questar Regulated, Questar Pipeline, 
and Questar Gas have the same management personnel; in other words, Questar Gas does 
not have independent management. Petitioners1 brief, for convenience, hereafter 
sometimes will refer to this common management as the "Questar Management." See, 
Order, In the Matter of the Application of Questar Gas Company to Adjust Rates for 
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Natural Gas Service in Utah, Dkt. No. 03-057-05, at 19 (UPSC August 30, 2004) 
(hereinafter sometimes called the "August 2004 Order").6 
In the early 1990s, the development of conflicts of interest among the Questar 
constellation of corporate entities became probable if not inexorable. Alert to this 
development, the Commission treated these risks of conflicts by promulgating standards 
and guidelines for "integrated resource planning" among these related companies. See, 
Final Standards and Guidelines for Integrated Resource Planning for Mountain Fuel 
Supply, In the Matter of the Analysis of an Integrated Resource Plan for Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company, Dkt. No. 91-057-09 (UPSC September 26, 1994) (hereinafter 
sometimes called the "1994 Planning Standards"). 
This "integrated resource planning" for Mountain Fuel was defined to mean "a 
planning process in which all known resources are evaluated on a consistent and 
comparable basis, in order to meet current and future natural gas energy service needs at 
the lowest total resource cost to MFS and its ratepayers, and in a manner consistent with 
the long-run public interest. The process should result in the selection of the optimal set 
of resources given the expected combination of costs, risk and uncertainty." 1994 
Planning Standards, at 13. 
In this regard, the Utility was ordered to submit planning reports twice a year. 
See, 1994 Planning Standards, at 13. Each biennial report was to be prepared after 
6
 The August 2004 Order is reproduced for the convenience of the Court in Petitioners* 
Addendum 9. 
7
 The 1994 Planning Standards is reproduced for the convenience of the Court in 
Petitioners1 Addendum 3 
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consultation with the Commission, Division, Committee, and other interested parties, a 
consultation that was to occur "on a regular basis during the year preceding the submittal 
of a plan." Id. at 13 and 14. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The process of consultation was premised upon a free-flowing information 
exchange. See, 1994 Planning Standards, at 5. The information exchanged would be 
current with the problems under discussion, consistent with the "Commission's position 
that gas acquisition decisions should be judged on the basis of information available at 
the time such decisions are made." Id. at 7. This consultative process, moreover, was to 
include "ample opportunity for public participation." Id. at 13-14. To insure that the 
process was followed, the Commission ordered consultations to occur at least quarterly. 
See, id. 
The Utility was ordered to file reports after consultation in an open process. This 
meant, conversely, that analysis and reports were not to be prepared by the Utility in 
isolation and then foisted on regulators after the fact. See, 1994 Planning Standards, at 5. 
A planning report, when submitted, was to be comprehensive in scope and detailed in 
analysis, including anything and everything that might touch upon gas resources, 
acquisition, processing, and delivery to customers in Utah. These directions are 
delineated in 15 paragraphs of the order, f 4.a. to f 4.o, nearly every one of which can be 
read to embrace the gas processing cost recovery issue being addressed on this petition 
for review. See, id. at 15-18. The planning report, moreover, was to include a list of 
"[considerations permitting flexibility in the planning process so that the Company can 
take advantage of opportunities and can prevent the premature foreclosure of options." 
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Id. at 18. (Emphasis added.) Once filed, a planning report was subject to review and 
comment by the public and approval by the Commission. See, id. at 8-19. 
Prudence review of Utility expenses, especially in light of proliferating affiliates 
in the Questar System, was a central concern of the 1994 Planning Standards. In its 
order, the Commission recognized the advantages of corporate restructuring, but 
admonished that, "Mountain Fuel's position in the corporate structure of the Questar 
Companies . . . must not constrain, in a manner adverse to the interests of ratepayers, the 
pursuit of the cost-minimizing objective.11 1994 Planning Standards, at 2. The 
Commission further stated that, " . . . in past proceedings, [we have] articulated . . . 
concern[s] about Mountain Fuel's relations with affiliates and the possible constraints that 
such relations may place on MFS's gas acquisition and planning process. Affiliate 
relations remain a concern of this Commission. We do not presume that affiliate 
transactions are biased and not in the customers' best interests. However, the Commission 
puts the Company on notice that with regard to cost recovery of MFS's expenditures, we 
will view MFS's customers' interests as primary. Such interests shall not be subordinated 
to those of corporate affiliates. All planning options that potentially benefit MFSfs 
ratepayers shall be investigated, whether or not they benefit subsidiaries of the Questar 
Corporation." Id. at 3. (Emphasis added.) 
The 1994 Planning Standards, in at least 7 places, at 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 12-13, and 19, 
emphasize the coordination between Utility planning and prudence review, concluding 
that, while "[t]he Plan will provide one basis for assessing the Company's decision-
making processf,]" nevertheless, "[s]trict conformance to the Plan does not relieve the 
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Company of its burden of proof to show that its expenditures are prudent." Indeed, in 
language that would be echoed later with specific reference to gas processing cost 
recovery, the Commission ruled that its "evaluation of prudence will be based on the 
reasonableness of the Company's decision-making process given the information 
o 
available at the time the decision is made." Id. at 19. 
8
 After Wexpro I and Wexpro II, many if not most of the Utah precedents dealing with 
affiliate conflicts and prudence review have been issued as a result of corporate 
transactions in the Questar System. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Application of 
Mountain Fuel Supply to Adjust Rates for Natural Gas Service in Utah, Dkt. Nos. 91-
057-11 and 91-057-17 (UPSC September 10, 1993); Final Standards and Guidelines for 
Integrated Resource Planning for Mountain Fuel Supply, In the Matter of the Analysis of 
an Integrated Resource Plan for Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Dkt. No. 91-057-09 
(UPSC September 26, 1994); Order, In the Matter of the Application of Questar Gas 
Company to Adjust Rates for Natural Gas Service in Utah, Dkt. No. 03-057-05 (UPSC 
August 30, 2004); Mountain Fuel Supply v. Public Serv. Common, 861 P.2d 414, 428 
(Utah 1993); Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission, 75 P.3d 481 (Utah 2003). 
These Questar-related proceedings are not isolated precedents, however. Transactions 
which are tainted with a conflict of interest between affiliates in regulated industries, 
because of their vulnerability to abuse, traditionally have been of concern to the public. 
Some of these transactions historically have been regulated federally under the 1935 
Public Utilities Holding Company Act. See generally, J. Seligman, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE, chaps. 5 and 
8 (rev. ed. 1995) (statute was intended to prevent gouging and looting between affiliates; 
these conflicted transactions otherwise would endanger utilities financially and cause 
deterioration in quality of service to customers). And dummy affiliates have inspired 
some of the most spectacular price fixing frauds with public utilities in American history. 
See, for example, M. W. Summers, THE ERA OF GOOD STEALINGS, 50-54 (1993) 
(describing Credit Mobilier and Union Pacific Railroad scandal). Public utilities 
jurisprudence in the state of Utah also has non-Questar-related precedents that treat these 
concerns. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Common, 152 P.2d 542, 559-
561 (Utah 1944) (dummy construction affiliate and unjustified fees); U. S. West 
Communications v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 901 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah 1995) (heightened 
scrutiny of affiliate transactions), US West v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 998 P.2d 247 (Utah 
2000) (diversion of utility business to unregulated sector). 
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(2) Prudence Review and Choices Facing 
Questar Gas in the Mid-1990s 
Respecting Treatment of Coal-Seam Gas 
In the early 1990s, while the 1994 Planning Standards, discussed above, were 
being formulated, the Questar Companies were becoming aware that, as a result of 
certain Questar Management decisions, the nature of gas for use in Utah was changing — 
to so-called "coal-seam" gas. Coal-seam gas is virtually pure methane with lower heat 
content that cannot be deployed safely in many if not most homes — without either 
special adjustments to residential appliances or processing at a facility to remove C02. 
This change in supply was forced upon Questar Gasfs attention by an affiliate, 
Questar Pipeline, which, as early as 1989, had recognized a future in coal-seam gas and 
sought to exploit that opportunity. Questar Pipeline had begun to enter so-called "future 
capacity" transportation contracts with producers of coal-seam gas in the Ferron Basin in 
Emery County, Utah. By the mid-1990s, Questar Pipeline had invested approximately 
one million dollars ($1,000,000) to improve a network to carry coal seam gas, and it had 
committed for additional investment as production of this commodity grew. At this 
stage, Questar Corporation was projecting $6.3 million per year for its Pipeline affiliate 
from carrying charges for coal-seam gas. By carrying the coal-seam gas "by 
displacement" through its southern main line, Questar Pipeline "ensured" that this gas 
would enter Questar Gas's distribution system at the Payson Gate. See, August 2004 
Order, at 24-25 and 20. 
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By 1994, when the Planning Standards had become final and effective, the amount 
of coal-seam gas entering Questar Gasfs distribution system "accelerated significantly." 
By 1997, coal seam gas was flooding the system at "dramatically accelerated rates." The 
Questar Companies, including Questar Gas, were aware of this development and the 
likelihood that it would continue as a consequence of Questar Management's decisions. 
This awareness is confirmed by the increased capital contributions, noted above, that 
were made and promised for Pipeline infrastructure — as well as the revenue projections 
for carrying charges that were being made. This awareness likewise is acknowledged in 
Questar Corporation shareholder reports of this period, a circumstance which, because of 
disclosure requirements in securities law, signifies the materiality of these facts. See, 
August 2004 Order, at 20. 
Facing these developments in the early to mid-1990s, the Questar Companies --
and Questar the Utility specifically — had available a wide range of alternatives to 
address the safety concerns of coal-seam gas in the local distribution network. Those 
alternatives included at least the following: 
(A) The Early Retrofitting Option. Questar Gas could have proceeded 
immediately to require Utah customers to re-tool appliances so that those appliances 
safely could accommodate coal-seam gas. The cost of re-tooling reportedly would have 
been substantial, but at that time this transition appeared inevitable in any event. (Indeed, 
customers now will bear this expense through a so-called "Green Sticker Program." See, 
January 2006 Order, at 22, note 3.) Exercising this option in the mid-1990s would have 
imposed a re-tooling charge sooner rather than later, but would have avoided imposing 
27 
the double burden of this charge plus the added expense of gas processing. The Questar 
Companies, however, may have leaned towards gas processing so that they could shift 
the expense of constructing a Plant to Questar Gas and Utah ratepayers, while at the same 
time profiting from processing contracts with third parties in an unregulated affiliate, 
Questar Transportation. Early implementation of appliance adjustment would not have 
served both these ends. 
In any event, there is no evidence that Questar Gas, as the Utility charged with a 
duty of prudent planning and disinterested decision-making, even considered early 
implementation of appliance adjustment or the conflict of interest that might ensue from 
Plant construction in Questar Transportation. Moreover, it is undisputed that Questar Gas 
did not pursue in a timely fashion the alternative respecting appliance adjustment, an 
alternative which would have saved ratepayers millions in processing costs. By the time 
Questar Gas approached the Commission on the subject of safety issues and coal-seam 
gas, in 1998, as described below, this option was foreclosed. See, August 2004 Order, at 
35 and 47-48. See also, Report and Order, In the Matter of the Application of Questar 
Gas Company for a General Increase in Rates and Charges, Dkt. No. 99-057-20, at 27 
(August 11, 2000) ("The record leaves no doubt, however, that by early 1998, the number 
of effective alternatives had narrowed to two: process the coal seam gas or keep it off the 
distribution system'1) (hereinafter sometimes called the "August 2000 Order").9 
9
 The August 2000 Order is reproduced for the convenience of the Court as Petitioners' 
Addendum 5. 
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(B) The FERC Options. The Questar Companies could have invoked a provision 
in the FERC tariff of Questar Pipeline, section 13.5, which might have allowed the 
Pipeline to refuse gas, including coal-seam gas, the quality of which was incompatible 
with safety standards for end-users. In a variation on this strategy, the Questar 
Companies could have sought declaratory relief in a FERC proceeding, insisting that 
processing costs be allocated to producers or others. Either approach might have resulted 
in allocation of processing costs to parties other than Utah ratepayers — either through 
negotiations or victory at the federal agency. 
FERC precedent at the time appeared to support the prospects for success in this 
regard. See, August 2000 Order, at 43 (dissenting opinion, Chairman Mecham). In a 
worst case scenario, playing the tariff/FERC cards might have ended in an adverse 
judgment, forcing Questar Gas to pay some or all of the processing costs connected with 
coal-seam gas. But even this worst case scenario, had it materialized in the early to mid-
1990s, merely would have eliminated one of several alternatives otherwise available to 
the Questar Companies in addressing coal-seam gas. At that juncture, the Questar 
Companies still could have exercised their remaining options. 
Questar Pipeline may have eschewed a tariff/FERC strategy for a variety of 
reasons, including a desire to avoid business complications with available producers or a 
fear that those business opportunities might be lost altogether. See, August 2004 Order, 
at 22-23. Or Questar Pipeline may have worried that tariff review might lead to untoward 
10
 FERC, of course, is an acronym for Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the 
administrative agency with regulatory jurisdiction over natural gas pipeline transmission. 
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changes, unrelated to gas quality, in rates or rate-structure. Indeed, the Questar 
Companies may have foregone these choices simply because they wanted to build the 
Plant at Utah ratepayer expense. A FERC ruling that required producers to bear the cost 
of processing the coal-seam gas would not have deprived the Questar Companies of the 
corporate opportunity to build the Plant, since a market for C02 removal as part of gas 
processing apparently existed then and continues to exist. But it would have deprived the 
Questar Companies of any excuse for recovering that expense from Utah customers. 
In any event, it is undisputed that Questar Gas, notwithstanding its duty of prudent 
planning and disinterested decision-making, never even researched FERC precedents on 
these subjects. See, August 2004 Order, at 21. And the Questar Companies did not test 
the waters or conduct negotiations for gas processing cost allocation to producers or 
shippers. Id. at 21-22. By the time Questar Gas notified the Commission, in 1998, as 
described below, that there were safety concerns with coal-seam gas, any opportunity to 
pursue a strategy at FERC had been foreclosed. See, August 2000 Order, at 27. 
(C ) The Pipeline Reconfiguration Option. The Questar Companies could have 
reconfigured their pipelines in order to divert or delay the introduction of coal-seam gas 
at dangerous levels into Questar Gasfs local distribution network. Even though a 
dramatic increase in coal-seam gas was projected by the Companies at that stage, they 
could have re-routed transmission sufficiently to allow time for Utah customers to make 
adjustments to household appliances at a lower aggregate cost. As noted above, however, 
any strategy such as this pipeline alternative that lessened a perceived need for gas 
processing would likewise have lowered the odds that processing costs might be 
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recaptured from Utah customers. In any event, there is no evidence that Questar Gas 
engaged in prudent planning or disinterested decision-making respecting any option for 
pipeline reconfiguration. Accordingly, this option, like every option other than building 
the Plant, died before it could be born. See, August 2004 Order. 
(D) Plant Construction and Ownership Options. The Questar Companies could 
have determined to construct the C02 Plant, but to have Questar Gas, rather than Questar 
Transportation, an unregulated affiliate, own the facility. Under this scenario, assuming 
the "prudence" of this choice in view of all others, the costs associated with the Plant 
might be borne by ratepayers, but the benefits to be derived from the ongoing business of 
processing gas for third parties also would have inured to the benefit of those same 
customers. 
The Wexpro decisions, cited above, dealing with not dissimilar circumstances, 
might have been cautionary precedents in the evaluation of this option, but there is no 
evidence that the Questar Companies even considered Plant ownership by Questar the 
Utility as a viable course. Those Companies apparently preferred to have Plant costs 
defrayed by ratepayers through regulated rates, while Plant revenues flowed exclusively 
to shareholders via an unregulated affiliate. 
Moreover, the Questar Companies had further options, even if they determined to 
construct the Plant within their System but outside the Utility; they could have 
"conducted a well-defined capital expenditure analysis to determine the most cost 
effective long-term structure by which to construct, own, and operate the [facility]," and 
they might have benefited from an "open bid process." The Questar Companies, 
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however, did not follow any of these avenues for the avoidance or mitigation of expense. 
See, August 2004 Order, at 24-25. 
(3) How Questar Gas Failed to Respond In the Mid-1990s 
With Any Prudence Review of Coal Seam Gas Issues 
As noted above, at least by 1994, the Questar Companies, including Questar Gas, 
were aware that the flow of coal-seam gas into the local distribution network was 
substantial and accelerating. But notwithstanding this awareness, there is no evidence 
that Questar Gas, throughout these years, "took proactive measures" to analyze or address 
the problems, including safety concerns, associated with coal-seam gas or any of the 
options, detailed above, for remediating or resolving those problems. Nor is there 
evidence that, as required by the 1994 Planning Standards, Questar Gas notified state 
regulators concerning this important development and developing emergency. See, 
August 2004 Order, at 20-21. 
The Questar Companies did not begin to address these issues until the end of 
April, 1997, when they established a so-called "Gas Quality Team". Indeed, 
notwithstanding the establishment of the Gas Quality Team in April, the problems 
associated directly with "the issue of increased production of coal-seam gas" were not 
addressed or analyzed for alternatives until several months later on August 20, 1997. 
See, August 2004 Order, at 23. 
At least three things are noteworthy respecting formation of this Gas Quality 
Team. First, as early as 1994, if not earlier, the Commission had ordered Questar Gas to 
consult with regulators concerning developments such as the influx of coal-seam gas on 
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the distribution network, and to file reports biennially on such subjects. These reports 
were to include, among other things, an analysis of problems with remedial alternatives, a 
list of "[considerations permitting flexibility in the planning process so that the 
Company can take advantage of opportunities and can prevent the premature foreclosure 
of options." 1994 Planning Standards, at 18. (Emphasis added.) Questar Gas, however, 
flouted this order, a violation which resulted, as described more fully below, in a 
predictable reduction of strategic choices which could have lessened the eventual cost to 
ratepayers. 
Second, the 1994 Planning Standards provided that the consultation process, noted 
above, should involve a freely flowing information exchange between the Utility and 
regulators, and should not involve decision-making in isolation by Questar management. 
See, 1994 Planning Standards, at 5. Here again, however, Questar Gas disregarded the 
Commission's order, forming the Gas Quality Team which met in private and then — 
waiting until the beginning of 1998 — foisted a "safety crisis" and a limited range of 
remaining remedies upon the Commission and others. 
Third, the Gas Quality Team was formed by Questar Regulated, and initially 
determined to focus on the FERC tariff in a search for remedial options. In May, 1997, in 
furtherance of this approach, the creation of a "Tariff Task Force" was suggested. This 
never was done, however, and after three more meetings (all of which, in continuing 
violation of the 1994 Planning Standards, were conducted in isolation and apart from the 
regulators) there was a shift in concern, with desiderata for the decision-making 
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"explicitly" turning to "include maintenance of Questar Corporation's financial 
performance." August 2004 Order, at 21 (emphasis added). 
The "divided allegiance" between Questar the Utility and Questar Affiliates was 
apparent ~ if not inherent and unavoidable — in these discussions, since the Gas Quality 
Team was composed of management members from Questar Corporation and Questar 
Pipeline. Hence, "[Questar Gas], as one participant in this team, was not independent in 
searching for the cheapest way to permanently solve the [coal-seam gas] safety problem. 
Said more forcefully, it appears that possible permanent solutions to the . . . safety 
problem were not thoroughly analyzed because of potential adverse impacts on [Questar 
Pipeline]." August 2004 Order, at 22. This "divided allegiance" between Questar the 
Utility and the Questar Affiliates, not only violated the procedural mandates in the 1994 
Planning Standards, but also undercut the purpose and spirit of those Standards which, as 
noted above, were designed, in major part, as a palliative for conflicts of interest within 
the Questar System. 
Although the Questar Companies had literally years to explore and even to 
experiment with the multiple options outlined above, and even though at least Questar the 
Utility was under compulsion to do so pursuant to the mandate of the 1994 Planning 
Standards, nothing was done. As noted above, the Questar Companies, through their Gas 
Quality Team or otherwise, did not analyze alternatives to the coal-seam gas safety issue 
until a meeting held in the fall of 1997, See, August 2004 Order, at 23. At this juncture, 
however, the window of opportunity was closed, and, by year's end, Questar 
Management had concluded that only two choices remained: (1) Plant construction and 
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C02 removal, or (2) consumer appliance adjustment. This latter option, moreover, was 
projected to take 4 years, even on an expedited basis, and therefore would be difficult to 
accomplish before the projected deadline of Summer 1999, when the safety issues 
associated with the coal-seam gas could not be remedied by any means except Plant 
processing. Given these exigencies, the question whether to build a Plant was at this 
point more rhetorical than debatable. See, August 2004 Order, at 23-24. See also, 
August 2000 Order, at 27. 
Faced with a self-made crisis that was caused by imprudence at best and affiliate 
conflicts at worst, Questar Management compounded these sins: Without doing any 
disinterested analysis and without considering open bidding or any other cost-saving 
procedures, Questar Management decided to pursue the Plant construction, to have 
Questar Transportation build the facility, and then to contract with Questar Gas for 
processing services, with all associated costs to be included in the Utility's rates to Utah 
customers. See, August 2004 Order, at 24-25. 
(4) Questar Gas Hands a Fait Accompli to Utah Regulators; 
Administrative Hearings and Judicial Review 
Leading to the August 2004 Order 
In early 1998, for the first time, and again in defiance of the 1994 Planning 
Standards, the Utility presented to regulators its pre-determined solution, the Plant, to the 
problem of coal-seam gas and consumer safety. Thereafter, various dockets were opened 
to address whether the contract between Questar Gas and its affiliate, Questar 
Transportation, should be approved and the costs associated with that transaction allowed 
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for ratemaking purposes. The question of prudence as a pre-condition to allowing these 
expenses also was raised, but went undecided initially in these dockets. 
In August of 2000, in docket number 99-057-20, with prodding from the Division, 
the Commission approved a so-called C02 Stipulation which blessed the contract 
between Questar Gas and Questar Transportation and authorized recovery of a portion of 
the costs associated with the Plant. See, August 2000 Order, at 23-28 and 47-49. 
Ric Campbell, now the Commission Chairman, was the director of the Division at 
that time. In pressing for approval of the C02 Stipulation, the Division, with Campbell at 
the helm, admitted that "a well-documented [Questar Gas] decision process, showing 
how all available alternatives were objectively analyzed, that is, at arms-length from 
affiliate interests, and the reasons why gas processing is the best among them, does not 
appear to exist[,]" and, accordingly, that, "[a]s a result, and even with the added time 
afforded by the present Docket, [we] cannot determine whether the choice of gas 
processing, and the contract which facilitates it, is prudent." August 2000 Order, at 28 
(emphasis added). 
Absent a record, contemporaneous with the events at issue, the only reasonable 
conclusion is that Questar Gas failed to meet its burden to show prudence. But Campbell 
and the Division were willing to disregard this long-standing principle of prudence 
review. Testifying alternatively that they were unable to "conclude the choice was 
imprudent," and that the contract was fffnot entirely prudent,"1 the Division and Campbell 
nevertheless requested approval of the affiliate contract and recovery of the costs because 
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of their concerns respecting customer safety associated with the coal-seam gas which 
they viewed as paramount. 
The Commission also was troubled by the lack of a record showing prudence, 
especially since Questar Gas, at that point, had had two and one-half years to produce 
evidence showing prudence in connection with the contract at issue. Indeed, the 
Commission, in unequivocal terms, concluded that, given the history of proceedings, and 
consistent with the Division's statement, quoted above, a record of prudence did not exist 
and could not be produced: "The record is insufficient to permit us to determine whether 
the Company's analysis of options prior to early 1998 was sufficiently objective and 
thorough, that is, to reach a conclusion whether options were ruled in or out as a result of 
the influence of affiliate interests. Nor can a sufficient record be developed." August 
2000 Order, at 27 (emphasis added).11 But the Commission also was swayed by the 
11
 The Commission later ruled, inexplicably, that this language was "an ambiguous use of 
dicta." Order, In the Matter of the Application of Questar Gas Company for Approval of 
a Natural Gas Processing Agreement, Dkt. No. 98-057-12, at 4 (UPSC December 17, 
2003) (this Order is reproduced for the convenience of the Court as Petitioners1 
Addendum 7). Any ambiguity in the language, however, is the product of hindsight. 
Everybody else at the time took this wording at face value and in context to mean that, 
not only had Questar Gas failed to produce evidence of prudence, but also that the Utility 
was unable to document this process in any way whatsoever. This Court, for example, 
read this language as stating that a record of prudence could not be made: "If the record 
had permitted, the Commission could have carried out its initial obligation to review the 
prudence of the C02 plant contract and its terms, holding Questar Gas to its burden of 
establishing that its decision to enter into the contract and the costs it agreed to were 
prudent and not unduly influenced by its affiliate relationship with Questar Pipeline. 
Since the Commission found that no such record was or could be made available, it 
should have refused to grant a rate increase that included C02 plant costs." Consumer 
Services v. Public Service Commission, 75 P.3d 481, 486 (Utah 2003) (emphasis added). 
What is more, later events would demonstrate that Questar Gas, in fact, could not 
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concerns expressed over customer safety, and, accordingly, approved the C02 
Stipulation, even though the Utility had failed to demonstrate prudence in connection 
with its affiliate transaction. 
The August 2000 Order was appealed by the Committee to the Utah Supreme 
Court which reversed the Commission's approval of the C02 Stipulation and its 
allowance of the gas processing costs. Justice Durham, writing for a unanimous court, 
stated the obvious: "While safety concerns may have necessitated the construction and 
operation of a C02 plant, they do not establish who should bear the cost of these 
measures." Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission, 75 P.3d 481, 486 (Utah 
2003) (hereinafter sometimes called the "2003 Supreme Court Opinion"). In other 
words, the questions of safety and prudence are logically unrelated and not mutually 
exclusive insofar as approval of the transaction is concerned. Questar Gas has a duty to 
provide safe service to all customers. Performance of this pre-existing duty does not 
automatically guarantee the allowance of costs. The relevant question is whether those 
costs were incurred prudently as a reasonable means to the ends of service — however 
exigent the concern for safety. If the Utility has mismanaged in the selection of means, 
then shareholders, not ratepayers, will — and rightly should — bear the cost of this 
produce any evidence of prudent decision-making in connection with the gas processing 
Plant. See, August 2004 Order. 
12
 The Court opined that, "[w]hile the Commission correctly recognized Questar Gas's 
obligation to ensure the safety of its customers, it incorrectly concluded that this fact 
provides a near-automatic justification for a rate increase regardless of how the initial 
threat to safety arose or how the utility sought to alleviate it." Consumer Services v. 
Public Service Commission, 75 P.3d 481, 487 (Utah 2003). 
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imprudence. State statutes mandate that utilities provide safe service in any event. 
Regulators may not allow utilities to use safety as an excuse imprudently to inflate the 
cost of that service by gouging ratepayers through sweetheart dealings with unregulated 
affiliates. 
The Court reminded the UPSC that the Commission, as "established practice," 
always had required a prudence review in connection with affiliate transactions, id. at 
485, and chided the Commission for "abdicating" this "responsibility" to hold Questar 
Gas to these same standards in connection with the transaction involving Questar 
Transportation and the C02 Plant. Id. at 486. 
Following the 2003 Supreme Court Opinion, the Commission commenced 
proceedings to review the prudence of gas processing costs. By this time, however, Ric 
Campbell had been appointed to serve as chairman of the Commission, leaving his post 
as director of the Division. On August 18, 2003, at an opening hearing on the affiliate 
contract, now-Chairman Campbell announced that, due to issues respecting bias, he 
would not participate in UPSC deliberations in this regard. In so doing, Campbell 
implied that his earlier role as Division director, especially in view of the Division's 
sponsorship, as advocate, of settlement stipulations, might create an appearance of 
partiality.13 
13
 Campbell announced his disqualification from the bench, stating as follows: "To begin 
with I just need to make a statement that I will not be participating in this case because of 
the appearance of any bias caused by my former role as the Director of the Division of 
Public Utilities. I was director at the time that this case was heard and argued, and I was 
involved in the policy decisions taken by the Division." Reporter's Transcript of 
Proceedings, In the Matter of the Application of Questar Gas Company for Approval of a 
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After Campbell's recusal, the Governor appointed Val Oveson to serve as 
commissioner pro tempore for the balance of the proceedings, see, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 54-1-1.6(1), and the Commission scheduled hearings that would resolve the 
question of prudence. Pre-trial and trial proceedings in this regard would last another 
year. After allowing parties an opportunity to marshall evidence that had been developed 
in 5 dockets over 6 years, and after giving Questar Gas still further opportunity to submit 
evidence showing that the decision in favor of the C02 facility was timely, adequately, 
and prudently undertaken,14 the Commission ruled that the Utility utterly had failed to 
satisfy any burden of proof in this regard, and that, by all appearances, the transaction 
between Questar Gas and Questar Transportation was tainted with a conflict of interest. 
See, August 2004 Order.15 
Natural Gas Processing Agreement, Dkt. No. 98-057-12, at 4-5 (UPSC August 18, 2003) 
(this reporter's transcript is reproduced for the convenience of the Court as Petitioners' 
Addendum 8). 
14
 As noted above, in the August 2000 Order, the Commission had concluded that, based 
on its review of evidence at that time (after more than 2 years of dealing with the 
problem), a sufficient record to demonstrate prudence could not be made. The 2003 
Supreme Court Opinion interpreted this statement to mean that a record showing 
prudence could not be established, implying that, on remand, the contract and associated 
costs perforce would be disallowed. The Commission, however, later ruled that the 
ff[n]or can a sufficient record be developed" language in the August 2000 Order was "an 
ambiguous use of dicta" and, showing extraordinary lenience, allowed Questar Gas this 
further opportunity to produce evidence demonstrating prudence in the decision to build 
the Plant. As seen below, however, even with this additional time and opportunity for 
making a case, the Utility could not bring any evidence to bear upon the questions of 
prudence in planning and conflicts of interest. 
15
 In these 2003-2004 hearings, as in earlier dockets, the Division maintained the position 
that the Utility should receive partial recovery of the gas processing costs. In a rebuke of 
this position, the Commission stated that, "[djespite years of analysis encompassing 
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(5) The Findings and Conclusions of the August 2004 Order 
Boiled to essentials, the Commission found that, from 1989 to late 1997, and in 
the teeth of the 1994 Planning Standards — a regulatory edict to plan for gas-related 
contingencies ~ there was no evidence that Questar Gas had engaged in any planning, let 
alone prudent planning, to find a conflict-free solution to the developing coal-seam gas 
safety problem. See, August 2004 Order.16 The Commission also found respecting the 
Questar Gas/Questar Transportation contract that "affiliate influence is clear." Id. at 45. 
several dockets," and notwithstanding an ongoing desire to award costs, in some measure, 
to Questar Gas through the C02 Stipulation and other compromises, "the [UDPU] has 
never concluded that Questar Gasfs decision to pursue C02 processing was prudent. 
Neither can we." August 2004 Order, at 45-49. 
16
 The Commission's August 2004 Order acknowledged the continuing relevance of the 
1994 Planning Standards by citing them at several points, and then, in the same vein, 
noted that "[t]he form and content of such evidence [for proving prudence] is necessarily 
case-specific, but we recognize that regulated utilities are sophisticated entities long 
accustomed to standard business practices such as forecasting, planning, budgeting, 
capital expenditure, record keeping and auditing." August 2004 Order, at 33. 
The Commission also confirmed the established practice of requiring contemporaneous 
evidence rather than hindsight reconstruction to prove these matters by stating that "we 
cannot allow after-the-fact summarization of a complex decision-making process to 
substitute for substantial contemporaneous evidence of timely, thorough evaluation of 
conditions that may impact ratepayer interests, including an evaluation of the costs and 
effectiveness of the reasonable alternatives that may be undertaken to protect those 
interests." August 2004 Order, at 33. 
This proscription of after the fact justifications (in lieu of timely preparation to encounter 
the future) was stated and re-stated in the course of the Commission's ruling. For 
example, at one point, while noting that, in the early to mid-1990s, Questar Gas had 
several potential solutions to the coal-seam gas dilemma, the Commission stated: 
"Unfortunately, while Questar participated in the review of some of these in 1997 and 
early 1998, there is no evidence that Questar Gas conducted an independent, thorough, 
long-term cost-benefit analysis of these options prior to Questar management deciding 
upon its preferred C02 removal solution. Its summaries and analyses conducted after-
41 
Hence, because there was a complete absence of prudent planning by Utility 
Management during this critical period, there was no timely consideration given to the 
various alternatives, noted above, that were available as possible solutions for the safety 
issues posed by coal-seam gas.17 
the-fact indicate that C02 processing was the cheapest short-term solution (given the 
time remaining within which it could implement its C02 plant decision), but there was 
apparently no discussion or analysis of whether there were cost effective ways of 
avoiding the coal-seam gas problem altogether or, alternatively, of providing a cheaper, 
long term solution instead of the expensive, temporary fix selected by Questar Gas." 
August 2004 Order, at 35. And as another example, while observing that Questar 
Management had not analyzed the prudence of having Questar Gas contract with Questar 
Transportation for building the Plant and processing the gas, the Commission stated: 
"While Questar Gas did provide after-the-fact analysis that, in the view of its witnesses, 
its arrangement with Questar Transportation resulted in a lower cost to ratepayers than 
would have an open bid process, we would be hard pressed, solely on the weight of this 
evidence, to determine that Questar Gas has met its burden of proving it prudently 
analyzed the issues prior to entering into the contract. For example, there was no analysis 
of whether ratepayers would have benefited if Questar Gas owned and operated the 
plant." August 2004 Order, at 43. 
And finally the Commission ruled as follows: "Despite the volume of documentation 
provided by Questar management in this case, it has been unable to pull from this 
mountain of paper the type of detailed, reasonable, and complete contemporaneous 
analysis we would expect of a utility to prove the prudence of its actions leading up to 
this requested rate increase. We find that a reasonable, unaffiliated utility properly 
focused on the best interests of its customers would have produced such documentation 
in the normal course of its analysis and deliberations." August 2004 Order, at 49. 
17
 The Commission found that Questar Gas, "probably by 1994," knew or should have 
known that the coal-seam gas would pose safety concerns in the distribution network. 
And even though there was a regulatory expectation of "prudent utility planning to reveal 
the risks associated with the possibility of [such] changing conditions," it could be found 
that "Questar management looked after the interests of its shareholders and Questar 
Pipeline," but there was "no evidence that it considered or undertook such planning 
anytime during the period 1989 to 1997 [on behalf of ratepayers and the public interest]." 
August 2004 Order, at 33-34. 
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The Utility dropped the ball in terms of early retrofitting of customer appliances. 
Indeed, the Commission repeated the Utility's testimony that resetting appliances would 
be fff[t]he best long term alternative/" but found that the lack of timely planning by Utility 
Management had caused a "postponement" of this "best" alternative, requiring 
consumers, in effect, to pay for two solutions to the same problem: first a gas processing 
Plant for a Questar affiliate, and then appliance adjustment at a later date. August 2004 
Order, at 35-36. What is more, the conflict of interest evident in this "neglect" and 
"postponement," and the possibility of prolonging the injury flowing from that conflict, 
even after construction of the Plant, were not lost on the Commission, which noted, at 
one point, that "customer modification of appliances may be at odds with Questar 
interests. Customer appliance changes or modifications obviates [sic] a need for C02 
processing, perhaps eliminating any need for the C02 plant before the end of it's [sic] 
asset life." August 2004 Order, at 25. 
The Utility dropped the ball in terms of seeking relief under the Pipeline tariff or 
in FERC proceedings. Some analysis or steps taken towards either of these alternatives 
might have fulfilled the "expectation] that a reasonable, unaffiliated utility would have 
seriously considered any option to keep this [coal-seam] gas out of its system entirely (or 
provided some delay to provide customers time to change appliance capabilities to utilize 
supplies containing coal-seam gas)." August 2004 Order, at 36. 
For example, the Questar Companies might have asked FERC to alter the tariff, 
seeking gas quality standards more compatible with the needs of Utah customers, and 
possibly obtaining a ruling that required producers of coal-seam gas to bear some or all of 
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the processing costs that would have been required to meet these standards. Whatever 
the outcome of this effort, according to the Commission's findings, "it appears that 
Questar Gas's customers would have been placed in no worse a financial position than 
they are now, i.e., at risk of bearing virtually all, if not all, costs to make coal-seam gas 
safe to use. These costs include the gas processing costs and costs to meet the remaining 
long term solution, 100 [percent] of the costs to adjust, replace or retrofit customer 
appliances." August 2004 Order, at 38. 
The Commission emphasized that FERC proceedings need not have produced an 
ultimate victory of cost allocation to gas producers in order to benefit Utah ratepayers. A 
proceeding at FERC might have served to "delay[] the introduction of coal seam gas for a 
period of time that would have permitted retrofitting of Questar distribution customer 
appliances, resulting in a long term solution to the safety issue." August 2004 Order, at 
39. The Commission found, however, that "[t]here is no evidence Questar management 
ever considered these or other methods to minimize the impact on Questar Gas and its 
customers of coal-seam gas or to buy additional time in which to modify the appliances." 
August 2004 Order, at 39. And by "no evidence" the Commission meant "no evidence:" 
"[T]here is nothing in the record — no contemporaneous legal memorandum, no meeting 
minutes, no e-mail, no testimony ~ to indicate that, prior to 1997, Questar management 
conducted any sort of analysis — legal, financial, or otherwise — concerning [the 
tariff/FERC options] or, indeed, consideration of other approaches to obtain sufficient 
time to retrofit customer appliances." August 2004 Order, at 39-40. To the contrary, the 
evidence suggested and the Commission found that the primary concern expressed in 
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inter-corporate minutes was for the holding company's financial interest, especially a fear 
that FERC proceedings might work to foreclose the capture of coal-seam gas 
transportation business by Questar Pipeline. See, id. at 40. 
The Utility also dropped the ball in terms of re-routing the coal-seam gas and 
other, related solutions. Questar Gas, arguing in hindsight, asserted that this approach 
would have been more expensive than the gas processing Plant. The Commission found, 
however, that no review of pipeline options was conducted by the Utility when such a 
review might have solved the problem. The Commission ruled that these second 
thoughts and revisionist thinking were no substitutes for thorough review in the first 
instance, because hindsight is never as helpful as foresight, and because this lack of 
foresight caused a loss of options in this instance, options that otherwise might have 
borne fruit, saving ratepayers from unnecessary and, in the end, duplicative costs. See, 
August 2004 Order, at 41-42. 
Questar Management again dropped the ball in terms of constructing the Plant 
through an affiliate rather than the Utility. The Commission found that, even if Plant 
construction were a prudent option under the circumstances described above, it could not 
endorse the no-bid contract between Questar Gas and Questar Transportation for building 
the facility and processing the gas. The Division had advised the Commission in an 
earlier docket that "a well-documented record demonstrating a reasoned, arms-length 
process by which Questar Gas decided to contract with Questar Transportation does not 
exist." August 2004 Order, at 43. 
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Indeed, the Questar Companies, through the testimony of Alan Allred, in effect, 
admitted that there had been no prudent planning — and hence there was no record — by 
their attempt to justify the decision to build the Plant on the basis of exigent, safety 
concerns. See, August 2004 Order, at 43. In fact, Allred confessed "that Questar 
management conducted no in-depth financial analysis because management assumed 
Questar Gas would recover any costs from its ratepayers" Id. Consistent with the 
mandate of the Utah Supreme Court, however, the Commisson ruled that "safety 
concerns such as existed in this case do not trump Questar Gasfs burden of demonstrating 
prudence." Id. at 43. Moreover, the Commission refused to countenance the bald-faced 
presumption revealed in Allredfs testimony, wherein Questar Management merely 
"assumes" that the Utility's ratepayers will pay for an affiliate's asset, absent any 
demonstration that those customers would benefit from the Plant and despite the Utility's 
refusal to give them all of the blessings along with the burdens of that facility. 
In short, the Commission found that, "[djespite years of analysis encompassing 
several dockets," the UDPU "never [had] concluded that Questar Gas's decision to pursue 
C02 processing was prudent. . . [and] [n]either can we." In a ringing refrain in the last 5 
pages of factual findings, "no evidence," "no evidence," "no evidence," the Commission 
ruled that the Utility had not satisfied the burden of persuasion to show that the Plant 
expenses were prudently incurred. August 2004 Order, at 45-49. 
Finally, the Commission previously had recognized that, under appropriate 
circumstances, "prudence review need not be an all or nothing outcome," August 2004 
Order, at 45 (citations omitted), that partial recovery of some expenses might be 
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allowable if the decision to incur those expenses was "adequately reviewed without the 
decision-maker being inappropriately influenced by its affiliate." Id. The Commission 
found, however, that even a partial recovery of Plant expenses was not warranted in this 
case — for three reasons. 
First, the Utility could not satisfy this more limited test for partial recovery of 
questionable expenses — as articulated in the cited precedent — as the test requires a 
showing of some decision-making review and the Utility, in this case, was not able to 
show even this, let alone make a showing that the expenses were "adequately reviewed" 
or reviewed "without the decision-maker being inappropriately influenced by its 
affiliate." See, August 2004 Order, at 45. 
Second, given the circumstances of neglect by the Utility in discharging its duty to 
undertake a prudent decision-making process — a neglect that allowed the crisis to 
develop and mature, prevented a timely, adequate response, and foreclosed opportunities 
for possible solutions that might have been less expensive than the C02 facility — the 
Commission was "unpersuaded that any unique economic benefit has accrued to Utah 
ratepayers to justify rate recovery." August 2004 Order, at 45-46. To the contrary, "Utah 
ratepayers are left with an imperfect, costly, and temporary solution to a long term 
problem." Mat48.1 8 
18
 The Commission's ruling, echoing again the 1994 Planning Standards, especially 
bemoaned these lost opportunities and foreclosed options, leaving regulators and 
ratepayers with no recourse against Utility management to either quantify the loss or 
redeem the time: "These additional two years [from 1995, when Questar Gas knew about 
the problem, to 1997, when Questar Gas first started planning to address the problem] 
may have rendered some of the options later discarded due to imminent safety concerns 
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Third, no mitigating circumstances were present in this case in any event because 
ff[o]n this record, we find that affiliate influence is clear." August 2004 Order at 45. 
While Utah ratepayers are unfairly saddled with the double taxation of Plant costs in the 
"short11 term and appliance adjustment in the long term, "Questar Pipeline has been able 
to pursue its interest in expanding its pipeline business opportunities^]" Id. at 48. 
Questar Gas sought reconsideration of the August 2004 Order. In particular, the 
Utility wanted assurance that the ruling respecting mismanagement and conflicts of 
interest only dealt with requests for the allowance of Plant costs through 2004. The 
ruling of the Commission on reconsideration stated, in effect, that an adjudication 
respecting prudence, by definition, deals with historical facts, facts known to the 
regulated entity at the time the decision respecting the expense in question was made, and 
that perforce only pre-2004 matters could have been treated in the August 2004 Order. 
The Commission further noted that Questar Gas was free to seek any further relief that 
the Utility deemed appropriate and that, should this occur, all parties in interest could 
raise whatever rights and defenses might be available to them at that time. This, of 
course is nothing more than a restatement of the statutory rights given all utilities in the 
state of Utah. See, Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-11. In short, the Commission 
declined to pre-judge issues or to give an advisory opinion on matters not before it. See, 
more desirable both financially and operationally." But in the final analysis, even this 
lost window of opportunity, and "whether these options would have been chosen in 1996 
rather than discarded in 1998 is not the point. The point is that we believe a reasonable, 
unaffiliated utility would have performed such analysis no later than early 1996, thereby 
affording all parties an additional two years within which to find and commence a 
workable solution." August 2004 Order, at 35. 
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Order on Request for Reconsideration or Clarification, In the Matter of the Application of 
Questar Gas Company for Approval of a Natural Gas Processing Agreement, Dkt. No. 
98-057-12 (October 20, 2004) (hereinafter sometimes called the October 2004 
Reconsideration Order) (the October 2004 Reconsideration Order is reproduced for the 
convenience of the Court as Petitioners1 Addendum 10). After denial of its plea for 
reconsideration, the Utility did not appeal the Commission findings in the August 2004 
Order. Those factual determinations, accordingly, became final and conclusive. See, 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-14. 
(6) UPSC Proceedings After the August 2004 Order 
Leading to the January 2006 Order and this Appeal 
In 2004, the Commission opened a new docket respecting coal-seam gas safety 
issues. This docket presumably was instituted pursuant to a clause in paragraph 3 of the 
August 2004 Order which had promised that the Commission "will also address, in a 
separate docket, how to craft a long term solution to the compatibility of customer 
appliances with natural gas containing coal-seam gas consistent with the utility's 
obligation to provide safe commodity and service to its customers." August 2004 Order, 
at 50. 
Over a period of months, "technical conferences" (6 altogether) were held in this 
docket. These technical conferences were used by the Utility to instruct, not only on the 
issues of appliance adjustment, but also on considerations of "prudence" in connection 
with ongoing costs for gas processing. Although Chairman Campbell earlier had recused 
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himself in connection with prudence-related litigation that led to the August 2004 Order, 
he fully participated in the informal discussions at these technical conferences. 
In January, 2005, Questar Gas filed a new application seeking rate recovery of 
C02 processing costs - $5.7 million per year — effective February 1, 2005. The 
application further "reserved all rights" of Questar Gas to seek recovery of these costs 
from the inception of the Plant. Ignoring the findings of the August 2004 Order that the 
Utility had failed to demonstrate prudence, the Utility demanded the right to show, in this 
new docket, that its decision to charge ratepayers for Plant costs after 2004 — on a go-
forward basis — would be entirely justified. Record on Appeal, Volume I, pages 130ff. 
In the early stages of this proceeding, Questar Gas, the Division, and the 
Committee adopted adversarial postures. Hence, in March 2005, a scheduling order for 
conducting discovery and pretrial proceedings was established. Trial was set for early 
October, 2005. Record on Appeal, Volume I, pages 230ff. At least — this is what the 
record — as then accessible on the Commission's website — stated. But behind the scenes, 
regulatory positions were softening and settlement negotiations were being conducted. 
The 2005 Stipulation was the offspring of these discussions. Like prior compromises, 
such as the August 2000 C02 Stipulation endorsed by Campbell and the Division, the 
2005 Stipulation allowed for the recovery of a portion of gas processing expenses - 90% 
of non-fuel costs from and after January 31, 2005 — or approximately $4 million per year 
going forward. Record on Appeal, Volume III, at pages 322ff. 
On October 11, 2005, the 2005 Stipulation was filed with the Commission. 
Record on Appeal, Volume III, at pages 322ff. If we are to believe Questar Gas, the 
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Division, the Committee, and the Commission, this compromise is a "new" approach -- in 
light of "changed" circumstances — to the gas processing cost issue that has plagued 
regulators for the past 8 years. Despite the "freshness" of this approach, this "alteration" 
in circumstances, and — as far as the public could discern from record then accessible on 
the Commission's website -- this abrupt "about face" from the parties1 adversarial mode 
(with a pending trial date) to sudden settlement proposal, the Commission gave curiously 
short (and, in petitioners' view, as elaborated below, constitutionally deficient) "notice" 
for a hearing on approval of the Stipulation. The 2005 Stipulation was first filed on 
October 11th. The date of the hearing was scheduled for October 20th. Parties in interest, 
whether public or private, had only 9 days in which to study the matter and prepare for 
hearing. Record on Appeal, Volume III, at pages 323ff. 
At the hearing on October 20 , 2005, the Division and Committee recommended 
approval of the Stipulation on a variety of grounds. As shown below, their submissions, 
in the main, were based upon factors of a type that the 2003 Supreme Court Opinion had 
found to be immaterial to prudence review: Gas processing at the C02 Plant is necessary 
to customer safety; the investment in Plant was necessary to process the coal-seam gas 
and that gas is cheaper by millions of dollars to Utah ratepayers; and these savings in gas 
prices more than offset processing costs. (The evidence is summarized in the January 
2006 Order which is reproduced for the convenience of the Court as Petitioners1 
Addendum 1.) 
The "evidence" on October 20 , 2005, moreover, was not contemporaneous with 
the decision to construct the Plant — as required by the Commission's precedents, 
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including the 1994 Planning Standards and the August 2004 Order, on prudence review. 
Any evidence satisfying these precedents, of course, would have been improbable if not 
impossible in view of the findings of the August 2000 Order ("Nor can a sufficient record 
be developed"), the 2003 Supreme Court Opinion ("Since the Commission found that no 
such record was or could be made available . . ."), and the August 2004 Order ("Despite 
the volume of documentation provided by Questar management in this case, it has been 
unable to pull from this mountain of paper the type of detailed, reasonable, and complete 
contemporaneous analysis we would expect of a utility to prove the prudence of its 
actions leading up to this requested rate increase. We find that a reasonable, unaffiliated 
utility properly focused on the best interests of its customers would have produced such 
documentation in the normal course of its analysis and deliberations[ ]"). Instead, all of 
the "evidence" was directed to the present time, and how best to deal with gas safety from 
that point forward. Not surprisingly, given the fait accompli of the C02 Plant, everyone 
now argued that processing costs were a "necessary" expense in light of these safety 
concerns. (The evidence is summarized in the January 2006 Order which is reproduced 
for the convenience of the Court as Petitioners' Addendum 1.) 
Much if not most of the "evidence" on the 20th of October was adopted by 
reference from an entirely different docket, the docket commenced in the fall of 2004, in 
which, as noted above, 6 days of technical conferences were held. Petitioners are unable 
to direct the Court to any documents that memorialize this "evidence," since no record 
was made of these 6 days of administrative "hearings." The "witnesses" in these 
"hearings" were not sworn; their "testimony" was not placed on any record. Indeed, there 
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was no notice to the public that the technical conferences were being held for the purpose 
of taking evidence in an effort to overrule the August 2004 Order. The style of the 
docket certainly suggested otherwise. The conduct of proceedings in the docket (that is, 
the failure to swear witnesses or develop any record respecting evidence) also suggested 
otherwise. Most important, perhaps, the presiding presence of Chairman Campbell, who 
earlier had recused himself from any decision-making responsibility concerning the 
allowance of gas processing costs suggested otherwise. 
A few witnesses testified in person on October 20 , but these were mere 
spokespersons for the parties, explaining why, in their view, rate recovery of Plant costs 
pursuant to the 2005 Stipulation was in the public interest. None was qualified to opine 
as an expert under the rules of evidence, nor was a foundation laid by the Utility to 
qualify any of them as an expert. And since the parties to the 2005 Stipulation — Questar 
Gas, the Division, and the Committee — were the only players at the approval hearing, 
and since these parties each had covenanted in writing only to endorse and never to 
oppose the deal, nobody was subjected to cross-examination. Every scrap of "evidence" 
in the brief record that was created October 20th, in short, was hearsay. 
Notwithstanding these procedural irregularities and evidentiary shortcomings, the 
Commission, with Chairman Campbell presiding (and no longer recused), adopted the 
recommendations of the parties and approved the 2005 Stipulation. This approval was 
memorialized in the January 2006 Order. 
After issuance of the January 2006 Order, petitioners, in their capacities as 
ratepayers and shareholders, filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code 
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Annotated, Section 54-7-15. The Commission did not grant the motion for 
reconsideration, and, therefore, pursuant to the terms of Section 54-7-15(2)(c), the 
January 2006 Order became final. 
Having complied with the provisions of Section 54-7-15, thereby exhausting the 
exclusive remedy for administrative review of UPSC orders that is found in our utilities 
code, petitioners sought judicial review of the January 2006 Order in this Court. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AND ARGUMENT 
Petitioners contend that they have standing to bring this request for review under 
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-15. These arguments are 
elaborated in "Petitioners Opposition to Motion for Summary Dismissal of Appeal," 
which, together with affidavits or declarations from certain petitioners, earlier was filed 
with the Court. Petitioners will not repeat or add to those arguments in this brief. 
Petitioners contend that the January 2006 Order should have been barred on the 
basis of res judicata by the August 2004 Order. The doctrine of claims preclusion 
applies to agency orders. In regard to the Commission, this is a matter of judicial 
precedent and statutory edict. Questar Gas had a full and fair opportunity to show 
prudence in connection with the Plant construction in hearings before the Commission 
from 1998 to 2004. The August 2004 Order fully and fairly resolved this question of 
historical fact and regulatory law. Res Judicata bars any relitigation of these issues — 
even through the back door of the 2005 Stipulation and the January 2006 Order. Rate 
case exceptions to invocation of claims preclusion theory are inapplicable in this 
54 
instance, since prudence review of Plant costs is a matter of past circumstances and not 
forward-looking adjustment. 
Petitioners contend that, even if the August 2004 Order does not bar the January 
2006 Order as a matter of claims preclusion, our rules forbidding agency inconsistency 
should be applied to reach the same result. The August 2004 Order, requiring evidence 
of prudence which is contemporaneous with the decision under review, not only is 
integral to the logic of prudence review, but also is consistent with Commission practice 
in relation to the Questar Companies, as well as other utilities, for decades. The August 
2004 Order, moreover, unequivocally found that the contract between Questar Gas and its 
affiliate, Questar Transportation, was "tainted" with conflict of interest. The January 
2006 Order is inconsistent with these long-standing principles of prudence review and the 
Commission's adjudication in the 2004 docket. 
Petitioners contend that, even if there were no August 2004 Order or prior practice 
respecting prudence review, the Commission's endorsement of the Questar Gas-Questar 
Transportation contract and approval of costs in the January 2006 Order runs afoul of 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-26. This statute - unequivocally - requires the 
Commission to disapprove all affiliate transactions. There are no exceptions. If the plain 
meaning of this statutory language is applied to the circumstances of this case, the 
January 2006 Order must be reversed and all Plant costs disallowed. 
Petitioners contend that the Commission's approval of the 2005 Stipulation in the 
January 2006 Order did not comply with the settlement protocols found in Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 54-7-1. While this recently enacted provision surely was intended to 
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encourage negotiated rather than litigated resolutions of utility-related disputes, it 
nevertheless mandates the use of substantive yardsticks for approval or disapproval of 
any proposed settlement. The January 2006 Order did not deploy these measures in 
approving the 2005 Stipulation. 
Petitioners contend that the proceedings leading to approval of the 2005 
Stipulation in the January 2006 Order violated the principles of fair notice and due 
process. The Commission fixed notice without first considering the statutory 
requirements of the settlement statute. Hence, notice arguably was inconsistent with the 
requirements of the Commission's own rules. Under the circumstances, especially in 
view of the history of these proceedings and the complex and confusing docketing 
arrangements, no fair opportunity for a hearing on the merits was afforded. The 
Commission, with Chairman Campbell presiding, was not an impartial tribunal. 
Petitioners contend that, under the private attorney general doctrine, articulated by 
this Court in Stewart v. Utah Public Serv. Cornm'n, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), their 
counsel are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees in connection with the prosecution of 
this appeal. 
A. Petitioners Have Standing 
Petitioners have standing to prosecute this petition for review under the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-15. Petitioners1 arguments in this regard are 
elaborated in "Petitioners Opposition to Motion for Summary Dismissal of Appeal," 
which, together with affidavits or declarations from certain petitioners, earlier was filed 
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with the Court. Petitioners adopt those pleadings by reference and will not repeat or add 
to them in this brief. 
B. The August 2004 Order Bars Allowance of Any Costs — 
Either Through the 2005 Stipulation or the January 2006 Order 
UPSC orders, under the doctrine of res judicata, may have preclusive effect. This 
doctrine may be invoked where the Commission, acting in a judicial capacity, adjudicates 
a factual question while making an application of law to those facts. See, e.g., Salt Lake 
Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d 1245, 12-51-1252 (Utah 1992). See also, Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 54-7-14. See generally, A. C. Aman, Jr. and W. P. Mayton, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Section 11.1 (1998). The doctrine has limited application in 
rate cases, naturally, since (a) rate-making ordinarily is deemed to be a legislative, rather 
than a judicial, function, and (b) rates usually are made with reference to projections of 
costs and revenues in the future, rather than being grounded in fixed circumstances or 
past events. See, e.g., Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d, at 1251. 
But the allowance of costs through a prudence view, as shown above, by 
definition, and as a matter of Commission precedent, treats the past and not the future. 
For this reason, adjudications concerning cost allowance in conjunction with prudence 
review typically are given res judicata effect. Indeed, Salt Lake Citizens, while 
endorsing the application of claims preclusion to UPSC proceedings, cites, as 
exemplification of this principle, the case of Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission, 433 A.2d 620, 624-626 (Pa. 1981), a case on all fours with 
our case, where plant expenses were disallowed on account of mismanagement and the 
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agency decision in this regard was given preclusive effect. Salt Lake Citizens v. 
Mountain States, 846 P.2d at 1250 n. 3, citing Philadelphia Electric Co, v. Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission, 433 A.2d, at 624-626. The Philadelphia Electric opinion, 
moreover, is one of several cases where agency decisions which have adjudicated utility 
expenses as being imprudent are given res judicata or collateral estoppel effect. See, e.g. 
Coalition of Cities v. PUC, 798 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1990) (imprudent plant costs; res 
judicata applied; utility may not have "second bite at the apple;" and "[t]o reject res 
judicata for historical investment facts in a ratemaking proceeding would allow a public 
utility to secure victory not by the strength of its case but simply by outlasting its 
opponents[ ]"); In re Tariff Filing of CVPS, 769 A.2d 668 (Vt. 2001) (proceeding for 
increase in rates; prudence review of contract to purchase power; rules of preclusion 
applied). 
In our case, the gas processing costs are not allowable absent a finding of 
"prudence." This much is established by Commission practice and judicial precedent. 
What is more, the gas processing costs, because they involve a transaction with an 
affiliate and therefore a potential for conflict of interest, are not allowable absent even 
closer scrutiny, and proof that the deal was not tainted with affiliate influence. This 
much also is established by Commission practice and judicial precedent, and, moreover, 
is mandated under Section 54-4-26 of our utilities code. 
The Commission made no finding on prudence in the initial dockets addressing the 
gas processing costs. The Commission's August 2000 Order allowed the costs in part, 
pursuant to the C02 Stipulation which had been made by Questar Gas and the Division, 
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but without any finding of prudence. The August 2000 Order was reversed by the 2003 
Supreme Court Opinion because these costs, as a matter of law, could not be approved, 
even in part, without a finding of prudence. 
Pursuant to the mandate of the 2003 Supreme Court Opinion, the UPSC 
established a consolidated docket in connection with prudence review of the C02 Plant. 
This docket had all the trappings of a judicial proceeding. Ric Campbell, the newly 
appointed Commission Chairman, recused himself for the sake of impartial adjudication. 
Pre-trial scheduling was ordered. Evidence from prior years was marshalled, further 
evidence was introduced, hearings were held, briefing was conducted. In this adversary 
proceeding, the Division again argued that the costs should be allowed in part. But after 
6 years of investigation, pre-trial effort, and trials, after review in several dockets from 
various angles, after considering "mountains" of paper and hours of testimony, the 
Commission, in a detailed, comprehensive ruling, denied allowance for these costs. This 
ruling, of course, was the August 2004 Order which found, as a matter of historical fact, 
that in the mid-1990s the coal-seam conundrum was the result of "crisis management," 
that the decision to address this dilemma through gas processing in an affiliated facility 
was "not prudent," and, even worse, the decision was the product of a conflict of interest. 
It bears repeating that the Commission, in so ruling, considered whether a portion 
of the costs should be allowed, something it believed might be possible under a UPSC 
precedent involving a telecommunications carrier. The Commission declined to apply 
this precedent or to approve even a portion of the gas processing costs, however, in view 
of three distinct and explicit findings: (1) the gas processing costs had not conferred any 
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economic benefit upon Utah ratepayers; (2) Questar Gas presented "no evidence" that it 
conducted timely, adequate, and disinterested decision-making in relation to the costs, 
and therefore failed to satisfy its burden of proof; and (3) on the record before it, the 
transaction was tainted with a conflict of interest because "affiliate influence is clear." 
Neither Questar Gas nor the Division challenged these findings or this ruling 
through an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Accordingly, the August 2004 Order still 
stands, final, conclusive, and impervious to challenge through "collateral actions or 
proceedings." Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-14. It is, as to the instant case, res 
judicata. 
The dockets opened in the fall of 2004 and in January 2005, which in turn led to 
technical conferences and the 2005 Stipulation as approved by the January 2006 Order 
are nothing more than collateral attacks on this August 2004 Order. Questar Gas and the 
Division (now joined by the Committee) again seek recovery of a portion of the costs 
associated with the C02 Plant. There was no effort in these new dockets, however, to 
reargue or modify the findings in the August 2004 Order, and, indeed, as noted above, 
any such effort would have collided with the absolute bar of Section 54-7-14. 
The parties to the 2005 Stipulation and the January 2006 Order may attempt to 
finesse these findings by arguing that the October 2004 Reconsideration Order 
"authorized" the Utility to file a new petition for cost recovery in connection with post-
2004 gas processing, and that the grant of this "right," in essence, overruled the defense 
of issue preclusion in relation to any claim for future costs. This attempt would fail, 
however, for at least two reasons. 
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First, the October 2004 Reconsideration Order, in effect, said that the August 2004 
Order adjudicated questions respecting prudence and costs which had been submitted by 
the parties at that time, and perforce would not entail future events. According to the 
Commission, Questar Gas was free to petition for additional relief, but others were free to 
respond and defend against any such petition — on whatever grounds were available, 
including, presumably, the ground of claims preclusion. In other words, the October 
2004 Reconsideration Order cannot be read to mean that claims preclusion would not bar 
relief in the event that Questar Gas attempted to revisit the questions of prudence and 
costs in any other docket.19 In fact, the October 2004 Reconsideration Order expressly 
declined to "pre-judge" any issues or outcome in the event the Utility sought further relief 
at a later time. See, October 2004 Reconsideration Order (a copy of which is reproduced, 
for the convenience of the Court, in Petitioners1 Addendum 10). 
19
 The January 2006 Order, at page 1, states that the August 2004 Order itself expressed 
an intent to open new dockets in order to "identify a long-term solution to the concerns 
raised by increasing volumes of coal bed methane on the Questar Gas system." This 
statement presumably is designed to excuse the subsequent collateral attack on the 
August 2004 Order that resulted in the January 2006 Order. However, the August 2004 
Order expressed no such intent. The entire text of that ruling is opposed to any such 
intent; it finally, unequivocally, and conclusively disallows any and all gas processing 
costs. The language of the ruling confirms this by ordering: "Questar Gas Company to 
file appropriate tariff revisions to reflect our determination that there be no cost recovery 
authorized for C02 processing operations." (Emphasis added.) The only language in the 
August 2004 Order which refers to additional proceedings or a separate docket is found 
in paragraph 3 of the ordering clauses. That language indicates an intent to conduct 
further proceedings to dispose of "funds collected to recover the cost of C02 
processing^]" in other words to handle the refund that would follow the ruling, and an 
intent to address in a separate docket "how to craft a long term solution to the 
compatibility of customer appliances with natural gas containing coal-seam gas 
consistent with the utility's obligation to provide safe commodity and service to its 
customers." Ratepayers still are waiting for that docket to open. 
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Second, even if the Commission had attempted to authorize a collateral attack on 
the findings and conclusions respecting prudence and costs in the August 2004 Order, 
this attempt would be unlawful in the face of Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-14, 
and, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission. 
The parties to the 2005 Stipulation and the January 2006 Order also may attempt 
to overcome the preclusive effect of the August 2004 Order by suggesting that the August 
2004 Order dealt with "past" or pre-2004 gas processing costs, while the January 2006 
Order deals with "future" or post-2004 gas processing costs, and that this distinction 
somehow makes a difference in the allowability of these costs. 
But this distinction makes no difference in the justification of the gas processing 
costs, either in logic or law. All gas processing costs, whether they "accrued" before or 
after the August 2004 Order, have the same cause, the same history, and the same effect. 
They arise from and were "incurred" in connection with the decision to build the C02 
Plant. They resulted historically from the Utility's neglect and mismanagement in the 
1990s. This neglect and mismanagement were compounded by the Utility's failure and 
refusal to obey the clear directives in the Commission's 1994 Planning Standards. Still 
worse, the affiliate contract for Plant construction, creating all gas processing costs, was 
the product of "affiliate influence" in 1998. In other words, had Questar Gas remained 
unblinkered by conflicts, and but for this infidelity to ratepayers and incest with affiliates, 
there might have been no gas processing costs - before 2004 or even after January 31, 
2005. Since all gas processing costs are the result of management imprudence and 
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affiliate influence, none may be allowed, not then and not now. This well was polluted at 
inception; the flow of water has not been cleansed through the passage of time. 
The Commission's faulty justification for endorsing gas processing costs for the 
period after January 31, 2005 — even though the Plant construction in 1998 which gave 
rise to these costs was deemed imprudent and even illegal by a formal adjudication in 
August of 2004 — is illustrated by the following hypothetical: A utility company 
president burned down the headquarters building. Through neglect, he had forgotten to 
maintain insurance to cover the loss. Faced with a "housing" crisis of his own creation, 
the president "fixes" the problem by contracting for construction of a new office 
complex. He does no investigation of different types of buildings, and he requests no 
bids on the construction. Rather, he chooses as the building contractor XYZ Corporation, 
which is owned and operated by the president and his nephew. The XYZ Corporation 
also finances the construction for the benefit of the Utility — taking back a 10 year note 
with annual installment payments. The local utilities board naturally refuses to allow the 
recovery of costs under this arrangement — when the loss is so obviously due to either 
misfeasance or malfeasance by the president and while there are suspicions about self-
serving relations with the nephew — and issues a sternly worded order to this effect. The 
president builds the building anyway. He waits 5 years and then files a new application 
20
 Indeed, the August 2004 Order, not only made findings, as noted above, that the 
Utility's misconduct caused the coal-seam gas safety problem in the first instance and that 
affiliate conflicts explained the Plant as the "solution" to this self-inflicted wound, but 
also that these conflicts may continue to injure ratepayers since the Questar Companies 
naturally want those customers to pay for the Plant in full through rates before addressing 
a permanent solution with appliance adjustments. See, August 2004 Order, at 25. 
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for cost recovery. He holds 4 or 5 technical conferences with regulatory personnel, 
showcasing the new building complex, and reviewing 10 or 11 "other options" for 
"warehousing" the business. All agree that, 5 years into the deal, with a new building 
already on the block, and the pressing need for a company headquarters, these "other 
options," although thoroughly examined with a lot of data requests, aren't as attractive as 
the XYZ facility. The regulators conclude that, since the "other options" aren't as good at 
present as the XYZ building, the remaining costs in the note balance must be "prudent." 
The local utilities board concurs and therefore rules that the final 5 years of the 
installment obligation are recoverable in costs. 
Even an apprentice logician can see that the conclusion reached by all the 
regulators in this hypothetical, i.e., the current costs for XYZ construction are "prudent," 
does not follow from the premise being invoked, i.e., that "other options" (none of which 
is any longer viable after 5 years) aren't as attractive as keeping the XYZ building. In 
short, having 10 or 11 (or even 100) alternatives less attractive than the XYZ complex — 
5 years into the deal — does not mean that the costs associated with building the complex 
were prudent in the first instance. 
It is obvious that present circumstances — that is, circumstances 5 years into the 
deal when the new application is being made -- cannot be used to justify the prudence of 
actions in the past — when the building burned, the insurance lapsed, and XYZ 
Corporation was hired. Even if the XYZ building is the only game in town after 5 years, 
the historical cause for this particular expense (as well as the present predicament) was 
management misconduct. In other words, prudence must be determined in light of 
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circumstances as they existed at the time of the decision under review. The time of the 
decision under review is when the building was constructed pursuant to the contract 
between the Utility and XYZ Corporation. And the circumstances at that time included 
the loss of headquarters through management misconduct. 
The January 2006 Order, like this hypothetical, suffers from these flaws in logic 
and law. The Commission artificially bisects time and divorces cause from effect. It 
ignores what is past and concentrates instead on existing alternatives under present 
circumstances to justify the processing costs going forward. But any lack of 
comparatively better alternatives to gas processing on January 31, 2005, does not 
establish "prudence" respecting Plant construction 7 years ago in 1998. Indeed, the lack 
of comparatively better alternatives to gas processing on January 31, 200,5 is the direct 
result of company imprudence in 1998. In fact, this is exactly what the Commission 
found in its August 2004 Order — that the Utility's negligence had foreclosed potentially 
comparatively better options, leaving ratepayers with the double burden of paying for 
both a temporary fix through Plant construction and the long term cost of appliance 
retrofitting. 
The Commission's approach ignores the 2003 Supreme Court Opinion's 
admonition that prudence requires a look at the "source" of the costs, an examination of 
the "cost-incurring activity," and a review of "how the initial threat to safety arose or 
how the utility sought [using past tense] to alleviate it." 2003 Supreme Court Opinion, 
at 486 and 487. 
65 
In addition, this approach violates a fundamental principle of prudence review, 
namely, that in order to determine whether the utility acted prudently, we must look at 
facts as they existed at the time the decision respecting the costs at issue was made, and 
we may not engage in hindsight reconstructions in this regard. 
The decision under review in this case was Questarfs determination to build the 
Plant in its affiliate, Questar Transportation. The facts respecting that decision antedate 
Plant construction in 1998. The Commission's "second look" at Plant construction, in 
light of circumstances which had come to be as of 2004, in order to see whether, under 
present circumstances, these costs are justified, does violence to this long-standing 
principle of rate regulation and cannot overcome the conclusive findings of the August 
2004 Order. 
Finally, the parties to the 2005 Stipulation and the January 2006 Order may argue 
that a "change in circumstances" or "new circumstances" now justify the allowance of a 
portion of the gas processing costs. But there has been no change respecting the 
circumstances relevant to prudence review for Plant costs, namely, the circumstances that 
existed at the time the decision to build that facility was made in 1998. No one can 
change the past Hence, on inspection, these purportedly "changed circumstances" are 
nothing more than an entirely speculative re-evaluation of the past and a self-serving 
recharacterization based upon hindsight — all in an unlawful effort to reverse, through 
collateral attack in a new proceeding, the preclusive effect of the findings of fact in the 
August 2004 Order. 
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For example, in this docket, the Committee reversed its longstanding opposition to 
any cost recovery in connection with the C02 Plant, concluding that cost recovery, at 
least in part, now is in the "public interest11 because of changed circumstances. See, 
January 2006 Order, at 13. The Commission followed this lead in approving the 2005 
Stipulation. 
The Committee noted and the Commission concurred that, since voicing 
opposition to cost recovery in previous dockets, there has been a "significant increase" in 
the purchase of coal-seam gas for use in the Questar Gas distribution network. The 
Committee interprets this development (with Commission concurrence) to mean that the 
Questar Companies were not as self-interested as once perceived in allowing the un-
arrested flow of coal-seam gas into the Utah system, especially since, price-wise, this gas 
has proved beneficial to ratepayers. See, January 2006 Order, at 13-14. 
But this "re-evaluation" is eyewash, and it is beside the point to boot. It is 
eyewash because the Commission already has found that the Questar Companies, as early 
as the mid-1990s, knew about or should have anticipated this precise development. By 
1994, the amount of coal-seam gas entering Questar Gas's distribution system 
"accelerated significantly." By 1997, coal seam gas was flooding the system at 
"dramatically accelerated rates." The Questar Companies, including Questar Gas, were 
fully aware of this development, and the likelihood that it would continue. Indeed, the 
use of coal-seam gas at all was entirely at their discretion. This awareness is confirmed 
by the increased capital contributions that were made and promised for Questar Pipeline 
infrastructure at that time. This awareness likewise is acknowledged in Questar 
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Corporation shareholder reports of this period. What is more, Questar Pipeline, at that 
time, had an incentive of $6.3 million in revenues per year to continue and enlarge the 
flow of this gas into the Utah system. Questar Pipeline, through a process of 
"displacement," was "ensuring" that this gas would enter Questar Gasfs distribution 
system at the Payson Gate. These are all explicit findings set out in the Commission's 
August 2004 Order. No amount of Committee or Commission "re-evaluation" from 2004 
to 2006 can alter the preclusive effect of these findings of historical fact. 
And any price-savings from the coal-seam gas — no matter how much, in 
hindsight, this may have benefited ratepayers — is beside the point as well. The quantity 
of coal seam gas and whether that gas, at cheaper prices, benefits ratepayers are not the 
issue. The Utility, as a regulated monopoly, has a duty "to operate in such manner as to 
give to the consumers the most favorable rate reasonably possible." This means 
purchasing gas at the lowest, reasonable price. This means treating safety issues in 
connection with that gas, through processing or other means, as prudently as possible. 
The issue is whether the decision to process the gas through a facility owned by an 
affiliate satisfied this duty. The Commission answered this question in August of 2004 
with a resounding "no." That answer allowed for the purchase of cheap gas, but 
disallowed the means selected for handling the safety concerns associated with that 
product. Indeed, the August 2004 Order found that the Utility's misconduct had 
foreclosed alternatives that might have obviated the need for gas processing altogether. 
The approach adopted in the 2005 Stipulation and the January 2006 Order to the 
same problem is that, so long as Questar Gas performs the pre-existing duties of every 
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regulated monopoly, to get gas inexpensively and to deliver that gas safely to the homes 
of consumers, regulators should wink at any prudence issues, self-dealing, or conflicts of 
interest in the manner by which the Utility has fulfilled these duties. In a reprise of the 
August 2000 C02 Stipulation, the Commission, with Committee support, in effect has 
added a "cheap gas" exception to prudence review. This is contrary, however, to the 
reasoning of the 2003 Supreme Court Opinion which overruled exceptions to the 
requirements of prudence with reasoning that would apply, with equal force, to any 
"cheap gas" rationale. To rule otherwise would mean that a regulated utility could hold 
ratepayers hostage, refusing to fulfill its duty "to operate in such manner as to give to the 
consumers the most favorable rate reasonably possible" unless the requirements of 
prudence are waived. The Committee, which purports to represent those ratepayers, 
should refuse to barter away one duty in exchange for fulfillment of another. The 
Commission, as a matter of law, may not abdicate its regulatory responsibility in this 
regard.21 
21
 The Committee may have believed that it obtained other, valuable rights from the 
Utility in exchange for these concessions. These rights included the Utility's promise to 
forego an application for gas processing costs accruing in 2004 and to waive the 
"reservation of rights" to pursue historical costs prior to that time. The "value" of these 
"rights," however, is doubtful. The Utility's claim for gas processing costs through 
August, 2004, had been fully adjudicated in the August 2004 Order. When the Utility 
failed to appeal this ruling, the ruling became final. No "reservation" of rights, however 
hopeful, will overcome the finality of that ruling. Moreover, as argued above, the August 
2004 Order found that all gas processing costs were imprudently incurred at best, as a 
matter of historical fact, and, since this finding cannot be challenged collaterally in any 
other proceeding, it effectively precludes any relief for the Utility in connection with 
these costs from and after August 2004. What is more, our utilities code, by statutory 
fiat, requires just and reasonable rates which rates may include only prudent costs 
untainted by conflicts of interest. Petitioners believe that neither utilities nor regulators 
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Finally, it may or may not be, as the Commission notes in the January 2006 Order, 
that the settlement process is an ideal process for the closure of disputes with less 
acrimony, effort, expense, and delay.22 These ends, especially the virtues of economy 
and expedition in the resolution of disputes, would have been better served in this case by 
enforcing the rules of preclusion, as required by our case law and statutory provisions, 
long ago. 
Indeed, had the Commission properly applied the doctrines of res judicata, claims 
preclusion, collateral estoppel, and issue preclusion at appropriate junctures in this 
controversy over the C02 facility, ratepayers and regulators would have been spared tens 
of thousands of dollars and years of effort. 
These proceedings commenced in 1998. The Utility was given over 2 years to 
show prudence. The Utility could not make this showing as of the August 2000 Order. 
At that time, the Division and the Commission concurred that no record of prudence had 
been or could be established. They nevertheless endorsed a "settlement" for the recovery 
of costs that was reversed in the 2003 Supreme Court Opinion. That should have ended 
the matter. Both Commission and Court at that time, after all, admitted that no record of 
prudence was available or could be created. But the Division, completely abdicating its 
may bargain away these statutory obligations. This view was confirmed by the 2003 
Supreme Court Opinion which refused to sustain the C02 Stipulation which, like the 
2005 Stipulation, was a compromise in derogation of statutory principle that had been 
implemented through well-established regulatory practice. 
22
 The C02 Stipulation and other, proposed compromises respecting the gas processing 
costs in these dockets have not demonstrated the virtues of settlement or the efficacy of 
that means of dispute resolution. This is largely because the parties involved, with 
Commission endorsement, continue to ignore the law of prudence. 
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duty to advocate in the public interest (and according to the established law of prudence 
principles), wanted to give the Utility another bite at the apple, another chance at a 
"compromise" recovery of half these costs. There was, accordingly, further litigation, 
ending in what should have been seen as the dispositive resolution of this contest in the 
August 2004 Order. However, rather than giving these findings the conclusive and 
preclusive effect which our cases and statutes require, our regulatory agencies allowed 
the Utility additional Mulligans in two more dockets, including approval of the 2005 
Stipulation in the January 2006 Order. They could have exited this merry-go-round of 
litigation in 2000, but instead they have given the Utility another 6 years in numerous 
dockets to press for recovery of these costs. Under these circumstances, the 
Commission's rhetoric about the economies of settlement is unpersuasive. As the Texas 
Supreme Court so aptly noted, "To reject res judicata for historical investment facts in a 
ratemaking proceeding would allow a public utility to secure victory not by the strength 
of its case but simply by outlasting its opponents." Coalition of Cities v. PUC, 798 
S.W.2d 560, 565 (Tex. 1990). Questar Gas has no case for allowance of Plant expenses; 
that is clear from even a casual review of the August 2004 Order. It therefore should not 
be permitted, by ceaseless importuning in collateral proceedings, to bully the Committee, 
Division, and Commission into regulatory capitulation. Salt Lake Citizens, citing 
Philadelphia Electric, should be followed and Section 54-7-14 should be enforced and 
the August 2004 Order, which found a lack of prudence and a conflict of interest as the 
source of these costs, should be given res judicata effect. This in turn requires reversal of 
the January 2006 Order. 
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C. The January 2006 Order Violates the Established Practice of Prudence Review 
Which Requires that Prudence Must Be Shown Only By Reference to the 
Circumstances at the Time the Decision in Question Was Made 
The Utah Supreme Court has overturned Commission orders respecting gas 
processing costs on two occasions. In both instances, the ground for reversal was the 
same: the Commission had acted contrary to prior practice, failing to follow an 
established principle. In Questar Gas Company v. Utah Public Service Commfnf 34 P.3d 
218, 224 (Utah 2001), the Commission was reversed for failing to explain a departure 
from customary procedures in the handling of a gas balancing account. In Consumer 
Services v. Public Service Commission, 75 P.3d 481, 485-486 (Utah 2003), the 
Commission was reversed again for lack of adherence to a long-standing practice 
respecting prudence review. 
As elaborated above at length, utilities have the burden of showing that expenses 
are justified under a prudence review, and this burden is heavier where affiliate contracts 
are involved. The Commission has required utilities to satisfy this burden with evidence 
that is contemporaneous with the events under review, as opposed to hindsight 
reconstructions and after-the-fact rationalizations. This has been the policy and practice 
at the Commission for no less than 12 years. See, e.g., Report and Order, In the Matter of 
the Application of Mountain Fuel Supply to Adjust Rates for Natural Gas Service in 
Utah, Dkt. Nos. 91-057-11 and 91-057-17 (UPSC September 10, 1993); Final Standards 
and Guidelines for Integrated Resource Planning for Mountain Fuel Supply, In the Matter 
of the Analysis of an Integrated Resource Plan for Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Dkt. 
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No. 91-057-09, at 7 (UPSC September 26, 1994) (these are the 1994 Planning Standards 
and are reproduced for the convenience of the Court as Petitioners1 Addendum 3); Order, 
In the Matter of the Application of Questar Gas Company to Adjust Rates for Natural 
Gas Service in Utah, Dkt. No. 03-057-05, at 27-33 (UPSC August 30, 2004) (this is the 
August 2004 Order which is reproduced for the convenience of the Court as Petitioners' 
Addendum 9). And, as noted above, this practice now appears at least partially to be 
codified in Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-4-4(4)(a)(ii)(f!judged as of the time the 
action was taken"). 
The reasons for this policy and practice are sound. The requirement of evidence 
that is contemporaneous with the event at issue insures the best record for evaluating the 
sources and causes of the problem at hand. It also insures that the process was followed 
at the appropriate time. We count on the process, followed in a timely manner, to 
produce the best planning and the optimum results. When the process is neglected, we 
are left with "what ifs" and "might-have-beens," or worse, the foreclosure of alternatives 
with lost time. The anti-hindsight policy, as noted above, is a prophylactic against 
23
 As the United States Supreme Court famously wrote in an analogous circumstance: 
"What is struck at in the refusal to enforce contracts of this kind is not only actual evil 
results but their tendency to evil in other cases." Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 173, 49 
S.Ct. 144, 149. Furthermore, the incidence of a particular conflict of interest can seldom 
be measured with any degree of certainty. The . . . court need not speculate as to whether 
the result of the conflict was to delay action where speed was essential, to close the 
record of past transactions where publicity and investigation were needed, to compromise 
claims by inattention where vigilant assertion was necessary, or otherwise to dilute the 
undivided loyalty owed to those whom the claimant purported to represent. Where an 
actual conflict of interest exists, no more need be shown in this type of case to support a 
denial of compensation." Woods v. City Nat. Bank& Trust Co. of Chicago, 312 U.S. 262, 
268 (1941). 
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Monday Morning Quarterbacking. So long as and to the extent that the process is 
followed, regulators may not second guess management, and, by the same token, 
management may not second guess history. Moreover, the allowance of hindsight might 
encourage rather than deter mismanagement, by forgiving rather than penalizing the 
failure to plan. 
There can be no dispute in this case that Questar Gas failed to plan for the coal-
seam gas contingencies which materialized in the mid-1990s. The August 2000 Order 
found, with Division concurrence, that there was no record that the Utility had followed 
any decision-making process in the face of these events. The 2003 Supreme Court 
Opinion echoes this finding. The August 2004 Order confirmed it. Having waited 7 
years, from 1998 to the opening of docket number 05-057-01 in January of 2005, for 
Questar Gas to show any record that appropriate decision-making was conducted in a 
timely, adequate, and fair manner, there seemed little prospect that new evidence 
concerning the decision to build the Plant would be forthcoming in technical conferences 
or adversary proceedings. 
And in fact there was none. Contrary to prior practice, the Commission did not 
require the Utility to submit evidence that was contemporaneous with the event under 
review, that is, the prudence or imprudence of building the Plant in 1998. Instead, all of 
the "evidence" that was submitted at technical conferences and in the adversary 
proceeding was directed at current circumstances and present alternatives in an effort to 
justify the recovery of costs after January 31, 2005. Those costs were caused, however, 
by events that occurred prior to 1998. That is the relevant time for a prudence review. 
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By failing to require and consider evidence that was contemporaneous with this event, the 
Commission departed, without explanation, from prior practice. This inconsistency, 
under the precedents cited above, is cause for overruling the January 2006 Order. 
D. Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-4-26, and the 
1994 Planning Standards Proscribe the Allowance of Costs — 
In Either the 2005 Stipulation or the January 2006 Order 
The Commission approved the 2005 Stipulation in the January 2006 Order 
pursuant to the settlement statute in our utilities code. See, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 54-7-1. Although that statute permits an expedited review of various issues, the 
Commission may not approve any settlement without considering "the significant and 
material facts related to the case,M without "evidence, contained in the record, 
supporting] a finding that the settlement proposal is just and reasonable in result," and 
without finding in fact that the "settlement proposal is just and reasonable in result[.]" 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 54-7-l(3)(d)(ii), (i)(B), and (i)(A). In other words, the 
Commission cannot subvert the utilities code by using the process of settlement. Even 
when that process is employed, rates still must be "just and reasonable," expenses still 
must be prudently incurred, and other statutory mandates still must be observed. 
One of those mandates is found in Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-4-26. That 
statute provides that: 
Every public utility when ordered by the commission shall, before entering into 
any contract for construction work or for the purchase of new facilities or with 
respect to any other expenditures, submit such proposed contract, purchase or 
other expenditure to the commission for its approval; and, if the commission finds 
that any such proposed contract, purchase or other expenditure diverts, directly or 
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indirectly, the funds of such public utility to any of its officers or stockholders or 
to any corporation in which they are interested, or is not proposed in good faith for 
the economic benefit of such public utility, the commission shall withhold its 
approval of such contract, purchase or other expenditure, and may order other 
contracts, purchases or expenditures in lieu thereof for the legitimate purposes and 
economic welfare of such public utility. 
It is accepted practice for public utilities to submit contracts for regulatory 
approval prior to execution, especially where those contracts involve substantial 
expenditures or questionable transactions. See, e.g., M. T. Farris and Roy J. Sampson, 
PUBLIC UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT, AND OWNERSHIP, at 94ff. 
(1973). This practice is required by statute under the circumstances described in Section 
54-4-26. And those circumstances existed as to Questar Gas and the C02 Plant in the 
1990s. 
As noted above, the 1994 Planning Standards ordered Questar Gas to submit 
reports semi-annually respecting all gas supply issues, especially as they bore upon 
affiliate transactions. These reports, in turn, were subject to public input and 
Commission approval. In this regard, the Commission specifically decreed as follows: " 
. . . in past proceedings, [we have] articulated . . . concern[s] about Mountain Fuelfs 
relations with affiliates and the possible constraints that such relations may place on 
MFSfs gas acquisition and planning process. Affiliate relations remain a concern of this 
Commission. We do not presume that affiliate transactions are biased and not in the 
customersf best interests. However, the Commission puts the Company on notice that 
with regard to cost recovery of MFS's expenditures, we will view MFS's customers' 
interests as primary. Such interests shall not be subordinated to those of corporate 
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affiliates. All planning options that potentially benefit MFS's ratepayers shall be 
investigated, whether or not they benefit subsidiaries of the Questar Corporation." 1994 
Planning Standards, at 3. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Having ordered the investigation of affiliate contracts between companies in the 
Questar System, those contracts are subject to the strictures of Section 54-4-26. The 
contract between Questar Gas and Questar Transportation falls within the ambit of this 
order and qualifies for scrutiny under the statute. Questar Gas in fact has conceded these 
points by submitting the contract between Questar Gas and Questar Transportation to the 
Commission for approval in earlier versions of these proceedings. 
However, the Questar Gas/Questar Transportation contract never has been 
approved by the Commission in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of our 
utilities code. The actual form of agreement between Questar Gas and Questar 
Transportation appears nowhere in the record of this proceeding, and the terms and 
conditions of that document are not detailed in the evidence or discussed by the 
Commission in its January 2006 Order. These failures ~ to consider the contract itself 
for regulatory approval in this docket, or to introduce evidence which explains the 
particulars and justifies all aspects of that transaction (independent of any putative 
superiority of the gas processing option) — without more, appear to defeat the 2005 
Stipulation as approved in the January 2006 Order. 
Moreover, the contract, even if it had been produced for inspection and review, 
given what is known and admitted about this transaction, surely will reveal either a 
ffdiversion], directly or indirectly, [of] funds of [Questar Gas] to . . . its officers or 
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stockholders or to any corporation in which they are interested/1 or that the contract "is 
not proposed in good faith for the economic benefit of such public utility[.]!! The 
objective of cost recovery in this matter, after all, is to divert funds from Questar Gas to 
Questar Transportation, an entity in which the shareholders of Questar Gas are 
"interested." And the Commission's August 2004 Order found that this transaction was 
tainted with a conflict of interest, and, as such, could hardly be proposed in "good faith." 
The Commission also found, in the same order, that the transaction conferred no 
"economic benefit" upon the Utility's ratepayers, and this is an indication, albeit indirect, 
that none was vouchsafed to the Utility either. 
Under these circumstances, the Questar Gas/Questar Transportation agreement for 
Plant construction and gas processing is proscribed by the statute and must be 
disapproved by the Commission ("the Commission shall withhold its approval of such 
contract, purchase or other expenditure"). That disapproval means that costs cannot be 
allowed for ratemaking purposes. If costs are disallowed, the 2005 Stipulation must fail, 
and the January 2006 Order which approved that Stipulation must be vacated. 
E. The Commission Did Not Follow the Requirements of 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-1, in Approving the 
2005 Stipulation in the January 2006 Order 
As noted above, in order to approve the 2005 Stipulation pursuant to the 
settlement statute of our utilities code, the Commission was required to consider all 
"significant" and "material facts" and to find that the "evidence, contained in the record, 
supports a finding that the settlement proposal is just and reasonable in result[.]" Utah 
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Code Annotated, Sections 54-7-1 (3)(d)(ii), (i)(B), and (i)(A). In entering the 
January 2006 Order, however, the Commission failed to comply with these statutory 
mandates. The Commission did not consider all "significant" and "material" facts ~ in 
relation to the gas processing costs — in this proceeding. The Commission did not 
receive any evidence that was relevant to the question of prudence in relation to these 
costs. The Commission violated prescribed statutory procedures for the introduction of 
evidence in connection with approval of the 2005 Stipulation. The Commission could 
not have based any prudence findings in the January 2006 Order on evidence other than 
hearsay, a result at odds with the governing statute, judicial precedent, and the 
Commission's own rules. 
(1) Failure to Consider All Significant and Material Facts 
Petitioners already have noted the failure of the Commission to review and 
consider the impact of Section 54-4-26 on the affiliate contract which created the costs at 
issue in this proceeding. The legislative judgment, embodied in Section 54-4-26, that 
affiliate contracts are to be scrutinized and disapproved under the circumstances 
articulated in that statute, by any measure, is a "significant" and "material" fact. 
The 1994 Planning Standards, promulgated by the Commission in the mid-1990s, 
put Questar Gas on notice that affiliate transactions are to be placed under a regulatory 
microscope. These standards were sufficiently "significant" and "material" to be given 
continuing vitality through citation in the August 2004 Order. But these standards were 
neither discussed nor considered in the January 2006 Order. 
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Nor did the Commission mention (except in cursory fashion) the "significant" and 
"material" fact of the August 2004 Order itself, or the manner in which that Order, 
through the doctrine of preclusion, as articulated in precedents such as Salt Lake Citizens 
or as mandated in statutes like Section 54-7-14, might have created an absolute bar to any 
further recovery of gas processing costs — in this or any other docket. 
Finally, the Commission found in the August 2004 Order that, as of 1998, the 
Utility had projected that 4 years would be required to implement any program for 
appliance adjustment — so that residential appliances could become compatible with coal-
seam gas, absent gas processing and the costs associated with the C02 facility. In 1998, 
the C02 facility was seen as an interim, emergency measure, so that the coal-seam gas 
could be processed and consumer safety preserved, pending implementation of the longer 
term, four year appliance adjustment program. If this strategy had been followed, when 
proposed by the Utility in 1998, the appliance adjustment program would have been 
completed in 2002. If the appliance adjustment program had been completed in 2002, 
there would have been no further need for gas processing after that date. If there had 
been no gas processing after 2002, we would not need the January 2006 Order which 
approves cost recovery for gas processing effective January 31, 2005. But if an appliance 
adjustment program had been implemented in 1998, as projected by the Utility, such a 
program would have eliminated the justification for gas processing cost recovery, and, 
hence, the Plant might not have been paid for at ratepayer expense. This inherent conflict 
of interest, as a continuing factor in the allowance of these costs, surely was a 
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"significant" and "material" fact that should have been — but was not — considered by the 
Commission in connection with its January 2006 Order. 
(2) No Record Evidence 
Even if the Commission had reviewed the "significant" and "material" facts that 
bear upon gas processing costs in these proceedings, that review should have been 
conducted in the light of "relevant evidence" take from "the record." The Commission, 
however, did not consider any evidence that is relevant to the question of prudence in 
connection with gas processing costs. The standards for relevant evidence in a prudence 
review, as noted above, have been fixed in prior Commission pronouncements. Those 
standards are clear: Prudence may be demonstrated only by reference to evidence that is 
contemporaneous with the circumstances that existed at the time that the costs in question 
were caused and created. Where the gas processing costs are concerned, that time is the 
mid-1990s, since the decision to build the C02 facility was made in 1998. The January 
2006 Order, however, was based upon "evidence" concerning circumstances in 2004 and 
2005. The "evidence" introduced to adduce those circumstances, accordingly, was not 
relevant and perforce could not be used to satisfy the requirements of Section 54-7-1. 
Even if circumstances in 2004, by some imaginative stretch, could be considered 
germane to the prudence of constructing the Plant in 1998, any "evidence" of such 
circumstances was presented and received, in large measure, in violation of judicial 
precedent and the rules prescribed in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act — and is 
not part of the "record" in the 2005 docket from which the 2005 Settlement was 
fashioned and in which the January 2006 Order was entered. 
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Much if not most of the evidence upon which the Commission relied in issuing the 
January 2006 Order was "introduced" during discussion sessions, so-called "technical 
conferences," involving the parties, the Commission, and others. These sessions were 
conducted in a docket that was created in 2004, prior to the 2005 docket which spawned 
the 2005 Settlement and the January 2006 Order. There is no "record" of what people 
actually said at these gatherings. But even if there were a "record," whatever "evidence" 
may have been heard in the technical conferences (in a separate docket) could not have 
been used for approval of the 2005 Stipulation in this docket. See, Los Angeles & S. L. R. 
Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 17 P.2d 287, 290-291 (Utah 1932) (it is "fundamental" 
that evidence taken in one docket may not be used merely by administrative notice and 
without formal introduction in another docket). 
The rule of Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. is codified in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 63-46b-8(l)(b)(iv) which permits the use of "facts" in a "record" from other 
proceedings where those "facts" could be "judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence." However, again, there was no "record" of the technical conferences in the 
other docket. This circumstance alone requires that the January 2006 Order be set aside. 
See, Lewis Bros. Stages, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 452 P.2d 318, 319 (Utah 1969) 
(absent transcript of record, Commission order is vacated, since judicial review, under 
these circumstances, becomes impossible). And even if a transcript of any record could 
be fabricated or produced, "evidence" given in the technical conferences did not qualify 
for "judicial notice" under the Utah Rules of Evidence, and, hence, would not be 
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admissible in support of the January 2006 Order. See, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 
In addition, none of the "witnesses" who made "presentations" at the technical 
conferences was sworn under oath, and, hence, whatever "testimony" they may have 
given was inadmissible in any docket under any circumstances in view of the 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-8(f). 
In any event, whatever was said during the technical conferences is unvarnished 
hearsay in relation to the formal adjudication that led to the January 2006 Order. While 
hearsay is not inadmissible in agency proceedings, it may not be the sole basis in support 
of any factual finding. This is a matter of statutory prescription, see, Utah Code 
24
 The Commission Rules, R746-100-10 F. 3., provide that the presiding officer at an 
adjudicative hearing "may take administrative notice or official notice of a matter in 
conformance with Section 63-46b-8(l)(b)(iv)." Section 63-46b-8(l)(b)(iv) authorizes a 
presiding officer to "take official notice of any facts that could be judicially noticed under 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the agency, and of 
technical or scientific facts within the agency's specialized knowledge." The Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Rule 201, permit judicial notice of "adjudicative facts" under certain 
circumstances. Readers of the January 2006 Order are not able to evaluate the 
admissibility of any evidence under Rule 201, because the "adjudicative facts" sought to 
be "noticed" are not identified, and the "necessary information" for recognition and 
evaluation of any proffer was not "supplied" as required under Rule 201(d). At bottom, 
since there is no "record" of the technical conferences, it is impossible for anybody, 
including a reviewing court, to assess the basis, let alone the quality, of the "evidence" 
upon which the Commission relied in formulating the January 2006 Order. This 
circumstance, in turn, makes it impossible to find, on review, that the Commission's 
decision in this case was based upon "substantial evidence." Finally, judicial notice is 
commonly limited to facts which are indisputable and can be found in the public arena. 
Such facts would be, for example, that the 21st of March 2005 was a Monday, or that the 
dollar is the currency of the United States. The doctrine of "judicial notice" would not 
normally extend to and is not properly applied to a party's contention regarding "facts" 
such as costs and options that were presented in the technical conferences which are 
hardly indisputable. 
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Annotated, Section 63-46b-10(3), and Commission regulation, see, Utah Public Service 
Commission Rules, R746-100-1 O.F.I. (". . . no finding may be predicated solely on 
hearsay . . ."). This rule also is enforced by Utah appellate courts. See, e.g., Yacht Club 
v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984); Lake Shore Motor 
Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 359 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959); Ogden Iron Works v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 132 P.2d 376, 380 (Utah 1942); Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 
449, 450 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1993).25 
The parties to the 2005 Stipulation may argue that the "evidentiary" presentations 
at technical conferences are not needed to support the findings in the January 2006 Order. 
They may contend that the pre-filed testimony, with exhibits and schedules, in this 
docket, as well as the policy statements made by several witnesses at the hearing October 
20th are enough to sustain those findings. 
Of course, pre-filed testimony, with exhibits and schedules, standing alone, will 
not satisfy a utility's burden to prove that costs are prudent and rates are just. See, Utah 
Dept. of Business, etc. v. P. S. C, 614 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Utah 1980). And the 
testimony at the hearing merely restated what was in the pre-hearing submissions. But 
more to the point — the pre-filed testimony, with exhibits and schedules, was submitted in 
support of the Utility's beginning application for total cost approval, rather than the 2005 
What is more, the hearsay nature of this "information," as well as the use of hearsay to 
the exclusion of any other "evidence" throughout review of the 2005 Stipulation, offends 
the "appearance of fairness" which is so vital to due process. See, e.g., Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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Stipulation which, if we accept the averments of the parties, was something different 
altogether and predicated upon "changed circumstances." 
What is more, none of this testimony, whether pre-filed or given from the stand in 
October, was relevant, qualified, or admissible as evidence in support of the 2005 
Stipulation. The witnesses, in effect, made policy statements; they did not give evidence. 
They were not and could not have been qualified to speak, as experts or otherwise, on the 
subject of prudence. All of the testimony, at best, was hearsay. 
In summary, Section 54-7-1 forces the Commission, before approving a 
settlement, to consider all "significant" and "material" facts which bear upon the case. 
Section 54-7-1 also provides that no settlement may be approved unless the evidence 
"contained in the record" supports a finding that the proposal is just and reasonable in 
result. The Commission did not consider all "significant" and "material" facts in this 
case. There was no relevant evidence submitted in support of the 2005 Stipulation, and 
the evidence submitted, from another docket, was not "on the record," nor was it 
"contained" in any record, let alone the record allegedly justifying entry of the January 
2006 Order. Under these circumstances, the Commission failed to comply with the 
settlement protocols in Section 54-7-1, and the January 2006 Order, which approved the 
2005 Settlement, accordingly, should be reversed. 
F, The Commission Violated the Requirements of Fair Notice and Due Process in 
Entering the January 2006 Order 
Commission orders which are entertained and entered in violation of the principles 
of fair notice and "due process" must be reconsidered and reversed. What notice is fair 
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and what "process" is "due" before administrative agencies such as the UPSC, of course, 
may depend upon the particular circumstances of any given proceeding. At a minimum, 
however, fair notice requires adherence to all applicable statutory and regulatory 
standards which govern the proceedings at hand. And, at bottom, due process requires 
notice which is adequate to the purpose being served, and a decision-making process with 
decision-makers having at least the cachet of neutrality. As shown below, the bare bones 
of fair notice and due process were lacking in connection with entry of the order in this 
case. Indeed, it does not appear that the Commission even considered the question of 
what would be "fair" in terms of notice under the totality of circumstances. The 
Commission, instead, blindly followed an erroneous reading of a Commission rule (a rule 
that was uncertain of application in this matter, and, in any event, unclear in meaning) — 
resolving 8 years of controversy with 5 days of notice. 
(1) Notice Giving Opportunity to be Heard Was Inadequate and Unfair 
The settlement statute in our utilities code, in one section, encourages the use of 
informal discussion and negotiated agreements for the resolution of conflicts before the 
Commission. See, Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-1(1). That same statute, however, 
in a subsequent and distinct section, allows the Commission to approve a settlement only 
"after considering the interests of the public and other affected persons to use a settlement 
proposal to resolve a disputed matter" Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-l(2)(a) 
(emphasis added). In other words, while settlement is encouraged in the abstract, before 
a settlement of particular issues in a specific docket is allowed, the Commission must 
consider the advisability of using a settlement process, as opposed to adjudicative 
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processes or other means, as a method to resolve those questions. And this weighing and 
selection of the most appropriate procedure for the resolution of a particular dispute must 
take into account not only the needs and desires of the parties formally in the docket, but 
also the public interest and the interests of persons to be affected by a decision in that 
docket.26 
The Commission notes the virtues of settlement in the January 2006 Order. See, 
January 2006 Order, at 26. But that Order nowhere "considers," as mandated by Section 
57-l-l(2)(a), whether the settlement process is the best process for resolving this 
particular dispute. And since the Order does not consider this question, it likewise fails 
to articulate any reasons for preferring settlement, as opposed to other forms of conflict 
resolution, in this instance. This failure of consideration and rationale, standing alone, 
requires reversal of the January 2006 Order. 
26
 Petitioners believe that this cautionary language in the settlement statute of our utilities 
code may be derived from unhappy past experiences wherein the Commission was 
deemed to have abused rather than used the settlement process to resolve significant 
issues arising in rate cases. See, Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 
763 n. 2 (Utah 1994), which, in turn, cites, quotes, and discusses MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. Public Service Commfn, 840 P.2d 765 (Utah 1992). 
27
 The Commission misquotes the requirements of Section 57-7-l(2)(a) and therefore 
misreads them. The Commission says that it may approve the 2005 Stipulation "after 
considering the interests of the public and other affected persons if it finds the stipulation 
or settlement in the public interest." January 2006 Order, at 25. Section 57-7-l(2)(a), in 
fact, however, says that the Commission may approve a stipulation "after considering the 
interests of the public and other affected persons to use a settlement process to resolve a 
disputed matter." The sentence points to a selection of procedures to resolve disputes, 
and whether the public interest and other factors will favor one process over another. 
Once this threshold decision to employ the settlement process (instead of another 
process) has been made, the substantive requirements for approval of settlements are 
found elsewhere in the statute. Those provisions, also contrary to the language in the 
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In any event, Petitioners submit that, if the Commission had obeyed the statute, 
and considered whether settlement was the preferred means of resolving this dispute, the 
Commission also might have given more thought to the question of what notice would be 
fair in this regard — especially if it determined that settlement was the proper route to 
pursue. 
That consideration should have included a review of the following circumstances, 
(a) The issue to be decided (the appropriateness of allowing recovery for gas processing 
costs) has been hotly contested for 8 years in 12 dockets at the UPSC. (b) It has been to 
the Utah Supreme Court and back on 3 occasions, (c) Several settlements or proposed 
compromises, such as the C02 Stipulation, have been waylaid during this regulatory 
pilgrimage, (d) At one point, in August 2004, the Commission found that the transaction 
between Questar Gas and Questar Transportation was infected with conflict of interest, 
(e) The public was outraged in the wake of this finding, and the Committee, as the 
champion for consumers, has been tenacious in opposing the recovery of these costs. 
The very fact of so many dockets, 12 altogether, spread over time, opening, 
consolidating, lying dormant, is a daunting hurdle to the "public" and ordinary "persons 
affected" by these issues. Cf. Utility Consumer A. Group v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 583 
P.2d 605 (Utah 1978) (consumer advocacy group denied due process in light of confusing 
Order, do not mention the "public interest," but instead require a finding that the 
compromise in question is "just and reasonable" in result. See, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 57-7-l(3)(d)(i)(A). 
28
 Two appeals resulted in formal opinions on the merits. One interlocutory appeal was 
denied. 
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circumstances in staggered proceedings). Even "cognoscenti," not to mention the 
"public" and "affected persons" who are the intended beneficiaries of the settlement 
statute, have experienced difficulty following and locating the next place where cost 
recovery will surface for decision in this regulatory shell game. Trade groups, 
businesses, and individuals who have an "interest" that is "affected" by gas processing 
cost recovery and who accordingly have obtained the status of parties through 
intervention in one or more of these dockets have been left to wonder whether that status 
goes by the boards when a new docket and then another and still another has been opened 
— assuming that they have received notice of these additional dockets at all — an 
assumption that cannot be verified on the "record" in this case. 
The Commission's docketing system is a shambles. Its website is confusing and 
difficult to navigate; many pleadings or items of correspondence, now found in the record 
on appeal, were either not posted or inaccessible if posted during the course of these 
proceedings. For example, after the Commission entered an order in August 2004 that all 
costs were to be denied -- ostensibly ending the controversy ~ another docket was 
opened, docket number 04-57-09, which, judging from the style of the case, was nothing 
more than an investigation of "gas quality," and not cost recovery. There was no 
pleading that initiated the docket, giving notice that specific issues were to be addressed 
or that particular relief was being sought. This impression would have been reinforced 
by the ordering clauses of the August 2004 Order which, as noted above, promised a 
separate docket for the purpose of exploring the issue of gas quality and appliance 
adjustment. What is more, Chairman Campbell, who earlier had disqualified himself 
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from participation when cost recovery was at issue, became involved in this docket, 
signaling again that issues of prudence and the like would not be revisited. 
The "public" and "persons affected" by cost recovery, however, could discover, 
only after the fact, that the "evidence" introduced at technical conferences in this docket 
was to be submitted for use in still another docket for consideration in approval of still 
another proposed stipulation on recovery of C02 processing costs. Hence, they were 
blind-sided and sand-bagged thrice: once by the circumstances and caption under which 
the docket was opened, again by the notice of "technical conferences" rather than formal 
evidentiary hearings on cost recovery issues, a notice which would lull the public into the 
belief that no formal adjudication of their rights was taking place, and still again by the 
presence of Campbell who was "recused" on any question of C02 Plant expenses. 
That other docket, number 05-057-01, was opened in January 2005 by Questar 
Gas. The Utility's application expressly sought to recover gas processing costs. If the 
public and persons affected were paying attention at this point, they would have expected 
the Committee, given its past performance, vigorously to oppose this relief. That 
expectation would have been increased by the entry of a scheduling order — on March 28, 
2005 — with pretrial deadlines and a trial setting in the fall of 2005. That expectation 
would have continued until suddenly ~ on October 11, 2005 ~ the 2005 Stipulation was 
filed. Only then, for the first time, the public and persons affected by cost recovery 
would have realized that their especial advocate, the Committee, had reversed its 
position, formerly refusing to give any quarter on the recovery of costs for the processing 
of gas, now agreeing to fold the tent and withdraw from the field. In a separate order, 
90 
the Commission criticizes 2 individuals for waiting to intervene until November, but it 
ignores the inescapable fact that no reasonable customer could have known that the 
Committee would surrender without a fight. 
What is more, the issues that were raised and the lines that had been drawn in 
Questar Gasfs opening petition in docket number 05-057-01, had been altered and 
redrawn completely, with the fashioning of an entirely new compromise, unlike any other 
in relation to this controversy, in the 2005 Stipulation. This had been accomplished in 
private negotiations during the mid-year months and filed for the first time in October, 
2005. 
The Commission, as indicated above, has shown a marked penchant for opening 
new dockets at every turn of this controversy. A new docket, at this juncture, might have 
been useful to explore the purportedly new provisions and changed circumstances that 
allegedly had produced the 2005 Stipulation. Such an exploration would have been 
useful to the persons affected by the stipulation, the real parties in interest, the ratepayers 
who would be paying an obligation that their regulatory proxies, tired of squabbling, now 
had agreed was due and owing. Indeed, such an exploration might be deemed imperative 
because the watchdogs had left their watch, forsaking their regulatory duties as 
representatives of the public interest and advocates for consumers, and agreeing instead 
to become partisans in defense of their compromise, before the Commission and in 
connection with any judicial review, at all costs. After 8 years of investigation and a 
29
 The best studies on regulatory agencies have concluded that, even absent such self-
imposed restraints on the rendition of disinterested advice, there often is an "agency 
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new turn of events, a few months more to look at a "new deal," after all, does not sound 
like a radical proposition. 
But the Commission did not open a new docket for the new deal on this occasion. 
The parties filed the 2005 Stipulation on October 11th. Without even waiting for the 
parties to move for approval, the Commission, on its own initiative, noticed up a hearing 
for approval of the agreement on October 20th. There was no pleading that put the 
matter "at issue" or that explained the purpose of the agreement in this docket or in light 
of prior events. Objections to approval were not invited and no deadline for opposition 
filings was mentioned. The notice referenced the stipulation on file with the Commission 
but did not attach a copy. The stipulation on file, in footnote 4 on the fourth page, asks 
the Commission to take administrative notice of "the information presented in the 
technical conferences in Docket No. 04-057-09," but the nature or location of this 
identification with regulated industries," and that "we do not need to subscribe to the 
theory of regulatory 'capture' in order to explain this tendency toward industry 
domination. Rather, the reason appears to be simply in the fact that regulatory agencies 
respond to the inputs they receive—in the same fashion as any other decisionmaking 
body. And, until the recent past, the source of almost all input to the agencies was the 
regulated industries. As the Landis report noted, '. . . it is the daily machine-gun like 
impact on both agency and its staff of industry representation that makes for industry 
orientation on the part of many honest and capable agency members as well as agency 
staffs." Public Participation in Regulatory Agency Proceedings, III Study on Federal 
Regulation pursuant to S. Res. 71, Sen. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess., at 1-3 (1977). These limitations on agency performance are recognized in our 
public utilities code, which grants any person the right to petition and be heard where 
utility action violates any provision of law, Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-9. And 
the need to supplement, if not supplant, Division and Committee efforts in utility 
regulation, in light of institutional constraints or bureaucratic incompetence, is reflected 
in our case law. See, e.g., Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 749, 781-783 
(Utah 1994); MCI Telecommunications v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 840 P.2d 765, 772 (Utah 
1992). Cf. Utah State Coal. ofSr. Citizens v. UP&L, 116 P.2d 632 (Utah 1989). 
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"information" is not specified. Had a member of the public or an affected person gone to 
the Commission's website, read the notice, and reviewed the stipulation on file, he would 
have had 9 days in which to prepare for a hearing. If he had attempted to prepare, he 
would not have had any testimonial information from the technical conferences (six in 
all) with which to do so, since no "record" in this regard ever has been available. 
Petitioners have detailed these circumstances at length because they want the 
Court to appreciate how members of the public, persons affected as ratepayers and 
shareholders in this matter, with this longer view and enlarged perspective, perceive the 
dismal reality of these proceedings. The settlement statute demands that, in deciding 
whether to pursue a resolution through settlement, the Commission should consider the 
interests of the public and all persons who would be affected by the proposed 
compromise. If the Commissioners, as guardians of the public interest, had done what 
the statute demands, looking to the history of this matter as detailed above, they would 
have concluded that 9 days is not enough for effective input and, indeed, that this limited 
notice and allowance of time simply is unfair to the very class to be protected under that 
legislation.30 
30
 The settlement approval process in the Wexpro proceeding, by contrast, was "widely 
publicized," involved no fewer than 8 days of public hearings, numerous disinterested 
expert witnesses, and outside review. The public was given additional opportunity to 
make statements, written and verbal, to the Commission. See, Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 615 (Utah 1983) {Wexpro II). The Wexpro 
procedure is a studied contrast with the expedited, abbreviated, and limited review given 
to the settlement in this case from October 11th through October 20th. 
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Given the circumstances described above, petitioners believe that the course 
pursued by our public agencies, including the Commission, does not satisfy the minimum 
requirements of constitutional due process. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. 
Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated 
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections[ ]") (citations omitted). 
(2) The January 2006 Order Was Not the Product of 
Impartial Decision-Making 
The Commission issued its January 2006 Order over the signature of Chairman 
Campbell — who participated in the decision-making process that led to the Order — after 
he had served for years as Director of the Division which had played, during his tenure 
there, a significant role in analyzing, negotiating, and litigating the question of gas 
processing cost recovery before the Commission — and after he had recused himself (on 
account of issues respecting bias) from deliberations on this subject once he had made a 
transition from Director of the Division to Chairman of the Commission. 
By issuing the January 2006 Order under these circumstances and with Campbell's 
participation, the Commission violated the principles and holding of this Court in 
Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985). In Anderson, an 
injured employee sought redress from a compensation fund at the Industrial Commission. 
The administrative law judge who initially presided in this proceeding retired and was 
replaced by Judge Allen who had served during an earlier phase of the case as counsel to 
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the fund. The Court affirmed the principle that administrative agencies must insure 
impartial decision-making through an unbiased tribunal: fMA fair trial in a fair tribunal is 
a basic requirement of due process.1 [Citation omitted.] Fairness requires not only an 
absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness." Id, at 
1221. 
The Court then ruled that Judge Allenfs change in roles, from participation on 
behalf of a party in interest in the case to a judge in the case, failed to insure the 
substance and appearance of fairness that due process requires. Following the precedent 
of Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 306 F.2d 260 (D. C. Cir. 
1962), which held that an SEC Commissioner should not have participated in revocation 
proceedings where he earlier had been involved in the investigation of the company that 
led to those proceedings, the Court quoted Amos in holding that: "'The fundamental 
requirements of fairness in the performance of [quasi-judicial] functions require at least 
that one who participates in a case on behalf of any party . . . take no part in the decision 
of that case by any tribunal on which he may thereafter sit."1 Anderson v. Industrial 
Common of Utah, 696 P.2d, at 1221, quoting from Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and 
Exchange Comm'n, 306 F.2d, at 264, which, in turn, is quoting from Trans World 
Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 254 F.2d 90, 91 (D. C. Cir. 1958). See generally, J. 
O. Freedman, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, ch. 15 (1978). 
The Anderson court further held that, under these circumstances, where the agency 
decision-maker has had prior involvement with a party in the case, disqualification is 
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required even without a showing of actual bias: fThe law presumes prejudice in such 
circumstances." Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 696 P.2d, at 1221 (emphasis 
added). 
Chairman Campbell undoubtedly sensed this bias when he first moved from the 
Division to the Commission, and, hence, recused himself from questions concerning the 
Plant at that time. He should have continued to follow this instinct, however, on all 
questions concerning cost recovery to the present time. This is not a case in which he 
may lawfully participate. 
The January 2006 Order must be set aside in view of this violation of due process 
and Chairman Campbell should be disqualified from participation in any further 
proceedings respecting the 2005 Stipulation or gas processing cost recovery. 
G. Counsel for Petitioners Should Be Awarded 
Attorneys' Fees Under the Stewart Doctrine 
Petitioners also request that the Commission award attorneys1 fees to their counsel 
under the private attorney general doctrine. See, Stewart v. Utah Public Serv. Comm'n, 
885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994). The facts here are virtually identical to those in Stewart - all 
the regulatory bodies abdicated their duties by stipulating to an agreement which was not 
in the public interest or the interests of the ratepayers; no one was left to advocate the 
publicfs interest; and Petitioners will "vindicate an important public policy benefiting all 
of the ratepayers in the state," and the "necessary costs in doing so transcend the 
individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization." Id. at 783. 
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Ratepayers are required to pay the salaries of Questar Management who dropped 
the ball in determining what might be a prudent way to avoid these costs. They are 
required to pay for the law firms which defend utility mismanagement. And they are 
required to pay for the government regulators and their attorneys who serve as rubber 
stamps for all of the above. The Commission now must permit the ratepayers to retain 
their own attorneys to champion their own and the public interests when all other 
advocates have abandoned them. 
IX. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Questar customers have been paying the highest gas prices in the history of the 
company, a fact which has been reflected often in angry letters to the editors of Utah's 
newspapers. It is at times like these that the public's interest in the role of the Public 
Service Commission is the highest. It is at times like these that the power of monopolies 
is keenly felt in every household that relies on gas for heat. It is at times like these that 
the regulatory agencies are scrutinized most minutely, in the public's mind, for any hint 
of favoritism toward the companies they are supposed to regulate. 
This case illustrates, like few others, the potential for the regulators to be co-opted 
by the regulated. In the real world of private industry, to which regulated utilities - as 
state-sanctioned monopolies - are only faintly related, the ill-advised or irrational 
decisions of managers are paid for either by the managers (who may lose their jobs) or by 
stockholders (who lose their profits). It is only in the world of regulated utilities that 
incompetent and unprofitable decisions can be foisted off on captive customers, if those 
who stand as watchdogs and protectors allow themselves to be worn down to the role of 
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rubber stamps by aggressive and persistent utility companies who are always willing to 
parse the hidden meanings and invitations of "no." 
Questar's decision to build the C02 plant has never passed the "reasonable and 
prudent" tests which the law requires of utilities prior to the construction of facilities. 
This Court looked askance at that decision in 2003. The decision unequivocally was 
disallowed as a prudent business decision by the Commission in 2004. Yet Questar's 
management comes back again and again, pressing for a "reconsideration" that has long 
since, under the statutes and precedents of our state, been debarred. 
The 2005 Stipulation was the fruit of this persistence. It was proposed by our 
regulators in a most curious turnabout — and in a manner which was calculated to make it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for customers to know or understand what was 
happening. The ratepayers reasonably relied upon the continued opposition of the 
Committee. The public reasonably believed that it was protected by clear and binding 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and the 2004 Commission. In announcing their 
surprise Stipulation in October of 2005, every regulatory agency abandoned its duty to 
protect and defend the public interest and to uphold the law. In its January 2006 order 
approving the stipulation, the Commission trod upon, not only the most minimal of due 
process requirements as to adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard, but, more 
egregiously, ignored and violated the bar of res judicata. Questar's highly-paid 
management made a risky decision to ignore the law and construct the C02 Plant without 
seeking advance approval as the statutes, regulations, and precedents require. The 
98 
company failed to appeal the August 2004 Order denying recovery of costs. What was 
imprudent in the years 1996 through 2004 did not, magically, become prudent in 2005. 
The Commission's January 2006 Order is reversible error, and it is the most 
egregious Commission gift to Questar's shareholders since the sly accounting for dry 
wells which resulted in Wexpro L Even more so, because in that case, the defense of 
captive ratepayers was vigorously and relentlessly pursued by an aggressive and watchful 
Division of Public Utilities. Here, sadly, customers have been left, totally, to fend for 
themselves; and but for these petitioners and their attorneys, no one - not even the 
Commission - is looking out for their interests. 
The C02 Plant, unquestionably, was an expensive investment. It was imprudent 
in 1998, and it is no less imprudent today. Someone must pay the freight, but not the 
customers. In a world where managers and executives bear the risk of their ill-considered 
decisions, and in the competitive business world utility regulation is supposed to 
approximate, it would be appropriate for some of those costs to be borne via a reduction 
in executive compensation, not to mention losses of jobs. If the Questar shareholders 
believe that their company's executives have injured their interests by wrongheaded 
business decisions, they have a choice — they can seek redress through the corporate 
oversight shareholders have always had with respect to management functions or they 
can sell their shares and invest in better operated companies. Ratepayers, in contrast, 
have no ability to change or escape mismanagement. They are captive and vulnerable 
and entirely dependent upon the regulatory agencies to protect them from utility 
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overreach. Here, the agencies have utterly failed them, and this Court should reverse the 
Commission order imposing gas processing costs on Questar's customers. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of October, 2006. 
JaherrTJenson~(4226) 
Jenson, Stavros & Guelker 
A Professional Organization 
350 South 400 East, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-4011 
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